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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary crises have become increasingly complex and the methods of leading 
through them have failed to keep pace. If it is assumed that leadership matters—that it 
has a legitimate effect on the outcome of a crisis, then leaders have a duty to respond to 
that adaptation with modifications of their own.  
Using literature sources, the research explores crisis complexity, crisis leadership, 
and alternative leadership strategies. Specifically, the research evaluates the applicability 
of complexity science to current crises. Having identified the manner in which crises 
have changed, it focuses on the gap between contemporary crises and the current methods 
of crisis leadership. The paper pursues adaptive methods of leading in complex crises and 
examines a number of alternative strategies for addressing the gap. The research suggests 
that a combination of recognizing the complexity of contemporary crises, applying 
resourceful solutions, and continually reflecting on opportunities to innovate, may be an 
effective way to lead through complex crises using complex leadership. 
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People are very open-minded about new things—as long as they’re exactly 
like the old ones. 
—Charles Kettering 
Mature landscape in sprawling city parks, pristine streets and a myriad of family 
friendly programs are just a few of the features that make the City of Highlake so 
attractive. At third largest in the state, it is a bedroom community that boasts a population 
of 200,000, yet manages to enjoy a surprisingly low crime rate. Highlake serves residents 
with a higher than average socioeconomic status, it has a popular entertainment district, 
and is home to over 40 schools. It is a booming city, but well planned and has become a 
model for many rapidly growing municipalities.  
Highlake plays host to an annual high school basketball tournament. The 
tournament, a boon to the local economy, is a weeklong event that draws teams, fans, and 
talent scouts from across the country. Three days before thousands of visitors are 
scheduled to descend on the city, railroad officials report damage to a tank car containing 
pesticide to the Highlake Police Department. Within minutes of the report, a white 
supremacist group known as the Sovereign Knights post an online video taking credit for 
the theft of 200 gallons of the pathogen. In the video, they are heard chanting, “The 
cleansing has begun.” A man in a faceless white mask claims to have contaminated the 
water supply of four unnamed schools and two unnamed restaurants in Highlake. The 
hate group calls for viewers to show their support by uploading the location and photos of 
minorities who dared to walk the streets of Highlake. The masked man closed with the 
assertion, “Any non-believers that aid the enemy will endure the wrath of the Divine’s 
messengers.”  
While watching the video for the first time, Chief Jacobson, a highly decorated, 
24-year law enforcement veteran becomes inundated with calls from officials from state 
and federal agencies, the railroad, the fire department, the city’s emergency manager, the 
mayor’s office, the chamber of commerce, public works, the tournament director, and 
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numerous media outlets. Chief Jacobson grabs his police radio and marches toward the 
Emergency Operations Center. Upon arrival, he confidently initiates the Incident 
Command System (ICS) by broadcasting, “I Have Command!” Seconds later, he begins 
to calculate the knowledge base needed to overcome the crisis and becomes very uneasy. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
• What Is the Nature of Contemporary Crises?  
In 1920, a bombing on Wall Street killed 38 people and caused $2 million worth 
of damage.1 In November 1955, a sabotaged piece of luggage caused United Airlines 
flight 629 to explode over Longmont, Colorado that killed all 39 passengers and five 
crew members.2 On September 11, 2001, 19 men from four different countries 
coordinated the takeover of four aircraft with simple box cutters to use the airplanes as 
missiles to attack the United States. The immediate result was 2,996 deaths. 
Are all crises created equal? Does the modern world present combinations of 
crisis opportunities that history has not, or could not, conceive?  
• How Can Leaders Adapt to It? 
If it is assumed that leadership matters—that it has a legitimate effect on the 
outcome of a crisis, then what are leaders doing to accommodate today’s crises? If crises 
have, in fact, become more complex, have this nation’s leaders responded to that 
adaptation with modifications of their own? If the game has changed, it is necessary to 
revisit the playbook.  
B. PROBLEM SPACE  
Much has been written about leadership. Even within the limits of leadership in 
crisis, a considerable body of literature is available. However, the author’s experience 
and research has led him to believe that a gap exists between the current methods of crisis 
1 Wikipedia, s.v., “Wall Street Bombing,” last modified April 29, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Wall_Street_bombing; Beverly Gage, The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of 
Terror (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1. 
2 Andrew J. Field, Mainliner Denver: The Bombing of Flight 629 (Boulder, CO: Big Earth Publishing, 
2005). 
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leadership and the nature of contemporary crises. The adage, “generals always fight the 
last war, especially if they have won it” comes to mind. It is the author’s suspicion that 
homeland security “generals” are still fighting the last war. This research is important as 
it considers the complexion of the next war and what leaders should be doing about it. 
The author’s hypothesis is that crises have changed over time. If true, it is 
possible that leaders responsible for dealing with current crises are playing by an obsolete 
set of rules. He has researched the nature of the modern day crisis to see if, in fact, the 
challenges that demand the attention of homeland security leaders today are different than 
those of previous centuries or even decades.  
He has also researched current methods of leading in crises. It appears a gap 
exists between the nature and complexity of the contemporary crisis and contemporary 
methods of leading. If crises have not changed, then it is not necessary to change the 
methods of leading to any significant degree. If, however, crises have changed, it is 
necessary to identify an appropriate means of bridging that gap.  
In his book, The Politics of Crisis Management, Arjen Boin points to that gap 
when he writes:  
Crises have the nasty habit of rendering plans and structures irrelevant. 
When uncertainty leads to bewilderment, both on the ground and in the 
crisis center, the crisis response does not resemble a neatly delineated 
process of operational and strategic decision making. Situational 
imperatives require intense cooperation and improvisation, especially in 
highly volatile conditions where there is non-negotiable time pressure. 
Such conditions are relatively rare at the strategic level of government.3  
Boin recognizes that “plans” (current prescriptions for leading through crises) 
sometimes do not meet the needs of the modern crisis. He suggests that “intense 
cooperation and improvisation” are the tools needed in such cases. The author suggests 
that leaders are not adequately preparing to use these tools.  
The thesis and research questions are based on the assumption that leadership 
matters. It assumes that the decisions made at the top of an organization are crucial to the 
3 Arjen Boin, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 55. 
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outcome of the response. If true, this research will be useful for taking the proverbial 
temperature of leadership in crisis and providing some remedies if it is, indeed, unwell. 
The author is hopeful that a review of the literature will reveal the state of crisis 
leadership, the nature of contemporary crises, and more suitable methods of leading 
through those crises. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Leadership 
As articulated above, the purpose of the literature review is to examine current 
methods of crisis leadership in light of the nature of contemporary crises. Ideally, the 
literature will make it possible to make the comparison between the two, and where a gap 
exists, identify alternative approaches to leading through crises.  
With hundreds, or even thousands, of definitions of leadership available, it is 
difficult to produce a succinct, yet comprehensive definition of leadership. In 1974, 
Ralph Stodgill noted, “There are almost as many different definitions of leadership as 
there are persons who have attempted to define the concept.”4 Leadership involves 
institutional, social, and personal influence. It can mobilize people and is able to arouse 
and engage followers. It can lift their vision and provide purpose, direction, and 
motivation. Leadership is able to point followers to a common goal and give them a 
unified purpose. Leadership may involve the coordination of groups so they can 
accomplish things greater than could be accomplished individually. Leaders may shape 
organizations, enact change, implement strategies, and achieve objectives. They have the 
opportunity to influence the culture of an entire organization or an individual’s identity. 
Knowing that leadership has the ability to “influence, shape, change, lift, direct, 
motivate,” what are this nation’s leaders doing during today’s crises? The literature 
indicates that Americans, as Westerners, tend to think very linearly in these 
circumstances. Americans are task oriented, adept at creating and completing checklists. 
Leslie Prince writes, “Although in the west we recognize the distinction, priority is still 
4 Ralph Melvin Stodgill, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York, NY: 
Free Press; London, UK: Collier Macmillan, 1974). 
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given to task and instrumental values. As a consequence our primary models still present 
leadership as the heroic exercise of power, and in our working lives we have lived with a 
form of aggressive muscular management...”5 James Spillane recognizes that this 
distinction may be a problem when he writes, “…in the heroic leadership tradition, 
leadership is defined chiefly in terms of its outcome. This is problematic because 
leadership can occur without evidence of its outcome.”6 
Literature also shows that leaders may have an unhealthy affinity for “best 
practices.” Pierre Beroux, Xavier Gilhau, and Patrick Lagadec see that a gap exists 
between many crises and the habit of leaders to look for conventional solutions. They 
write, “Today’s crises tend to overwhelm traditional crisis management mechanisms and 
organisational frameworks. In so doing, they trigger ‘stun effects’, as even trusted best 
practice becomes outmoded.”7 David Snowden and Mary Boone point out the 
shortcomings of leaders that use best practices as a reference point. “Finally, it’s 
important to remember that best practice is, by definition, past practice. Using best 
practices is common, and often appropriate, in simple contexts. Difficulties arise, 
however, if staff members are discouraged from bucking the process even when it’s not 
working anymore. Since hindsight no longer leads to foresight after a shift in context, a 
corresponding change in management style may be called for.”8  
2. Contemporary Crises 
While the crises of past decades could not be characterized as “simple,” a 
complexity exists in contemporary crises that did not exist, or more accurately, could not 
exist in prior decades. Early organizational management theory suggested that 
organizational behavior could be controlled through proper leadership. In 1917, one 
researcher, Henri Fayol, wrote, “To manage is to forecast and plan, to organize, to 
5 Lesley Prince, “Eating the Menu Rather than the Dinner: Tao and Leadership,” Leadership 1, no. 1 
(2005): 105–126. 
6 James P. Spillane, Distributed Leadership, vol. 4 (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012). 
7 Patrick Lagadec, Xavier Guilhou, and Pierre Béroux, “Rapid Reflection Forces Put to the Reality 
Test,” Crisis Response Journal 4, no. 2 (2008): 38–40. 
8 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review 85, no. 11 (November 2007): 68–76. 
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command, to co-ordinate, and to control.”9 Within the same decade, Frederick W. Taylor 
wrote, “Scientific Management will mean, for the employers and the workmen who adopt 
it, the elimination of almost all causes for dispute and disagreement between them.”10 For 
them, organizational problems were solvable. Administrative solutions were a matter of 
identifying and applying the right formula to achieve the desired outcome. During this 
era, organizational crises were not viewed as simple, but they may not have been 
considered insuperable.  
Conversely, Berkes addresses the futility of trying to condense and simplify 
uncertainties and recommends a responding course of action. He writes, “The importance 
of uncertainties is generally well known, but the irreducible nature of uncertainties in 
complex systems is generally not appreciated…We need to discover ways to reduce the 
degree of uncertainty about the dynamics of these complex systems. At the same time, we 
need to develop new approaches to cope with change that cannot be predicted.”11 
Traditional types of planning assume that crises have a measure of predictability 
and, while they may be large in scale, they are still linear in nature. However, history 
reveals that many crises are intrinsically complex and are not linear events that can be 
“managed” with the right formula. It is known that stability is a passing phase that has 
been described as a “pause in an unmappable dynamism.”12 Patrick Lagadec and 
Benjamin Topper also address the issue when they write, “Today hyper-complex crises 
demand something else, and probably exactly at the opposite; the capacity to ask the 
tough questions, the preparation to navigate unmapped situations.”13  
9 Henri Fayol, Frederick W. Taylor, and Peter F. Drucker, “Management and Decision-Making in 
Organizations,” accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.corwin.com/upm-data/15500_Chapter_3.pdf, 95. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Fikret Berkes, “Understanding Uncertainty and Reducing Vulnerability: Lessons from Resilience 
Thinking,” Natural Hazards 41, no. 2 (2007): 283–295. 
12 Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly 
Surprises Us and What to Do About It, 1 Back Bay pbk ed. (New York, NY: Back Bay Books, 2009), 285. 
13 Patrick Lagadec and Benjamin Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” International 
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 2, no. 1 (2012): 21–33. 
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Literature surrounding complexity science provides comparisons to the nature of 
contemporary crises. Specifically, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi draws the correlation between 
the language of complex systems and an act of terrorism with the following quote: 
A dramatic example of the pervasiveness of this new language came after 
September 11, 2001, when networks acquired a meaning previously 
unfamiliar to most of us. Most of what led to the tragedy makes perfect 
sense from a network perspective. Al Qaeda, the terrorist network held 
responsible for the attacks, was not created in seven days. Driven by 
religious beliefs and impatience with the existing social and political 
order, thousands were drawn to the radical organization over several years. 
The network expanded one node at a time, taking on all the characteristics 
of a web without a spider. Indeed, al Qaeda failed to turn into the hub-and-
spoke network that offers a central leader control over all details. It 
avoided the tree structure as well, the chain of command characterizing the 
military and twentieth-century corporations. Rather, it evolved into a self-
organized spider less web in which a hierarchy of hubs kept the 
organization together.14  
The literature shows that, in one sense, complexity has been leveraged positively 
in the form of optimization. The result, however, is that the “unmappable dynamism” of 
instability is compounded in a highly optimized environment. Through the ongoing 
exercise of optimization, Americans have made themselves increasingly more vulnerable 
to “interactive complexity and tight coupling.”15 Ramo notes, “we are now tied to one 
another in ways we can’t see, through webs of finance or disease or information, and—
here’s the dangerous paradox—the more closely we’re bound, the less resilient we all 
become.” 
If the research bears out the fact that contemporary crises have, in fact, become 
disproportionately more complex than this nation’s methods of adaptively leading 
through them, then innovation will be necessary. This country has a duty to address the 
gap.  
14 Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It 
Means (New York, NY: Plume, 2003), 222. 
15 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1984), 386. 
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3. Identifying Alternative Strategies 
Michael J. Bolton and Gregory B. Stolcis articulate the need for thinking 
differently when complex crises occur. “Incremental administrative changes are adequate 
in addressing organizational problems and improving effectiveness during periods of 
stability and equilibrium. They are ineffective, however, when ‘wicked’ problems alter 
the decision-making environment because there is little time to react to changing 
conditions. These problems are wicked because they are poorly formulated and fall 
outside normal boundaries of decision-making.”16 
Initial research indicates that this nation’s current reaction to crises is to reference 
best practices. However, best practices is an organizational cliché that brings a sense of 
comfort to leaders. They are methods that serve as benchmarks for things that have been 
tested, and subsequently, identified as “as good as can be expected.” Literature 
surrounding sense-making tools, such as Snowden’s Cynefin Framework, reveals that a 
well suited time and place exists for best practices. However, the same tool reveals that a 
time also exists for emergent and novel approaches to complex crises. It is during these 
times that best practices may not be good enough. “Humans have a tendency to behave—
almost without exception—as though they believe that experience teaches them lessons, 
in a very cause-consequence, past-present, ‘linear’ line of thought…We still seem, at 
every turn, to lack this critical self-awareness, this realization that more of the same is not 
the solution.”17 It appears that thinking linearly during complex crises may come at a 
heavy cost.  
In spite of the cost, literature shows that barriers to adaptive change do exist. 
Lagadec and Topper note, “…the leader must have the conviction and the vision to lead 
the community out of its initial disorientation, and to avoid the two pitfalls that are 
always present in extreme crises: bureaucratic inertia (where each organization waits 
until the crisis fits its codes and rules), and the general loss of nerve (not only within the 
16 Michael J. Bolton and Gregory B. Stolcis, “Overcoming Failure of Imagination in Crisis 
Management: The Complex Adaptive System,” The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation 
Journal 13, no. 3 (2008): 1–12. 
17 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” 21–33. 
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public, but throughout the entire chain of command).”18 Another barrier to employing 
alternative strategies is risk. Integral to the concept of innovation and change is the 
admission that the leader is not prepared to handle any and every crisis adequately. It 
requires an explicit acknowledgement that crises may exceed their current capabilities. 
While the concept may be self-evident, it is not politically expedient.  
The literature review appears to indicate that contemporary crises are more 
complex than ever before and that this nation’s current methods of leading through them 
are inadequate. It also appears new and creative mechanisms may be available to address 
that gap. The author investigates the matter using the method outlined as follows. 
D. METHOD 
Using literature sources, the research explores crisis complexity, crisis leadership, 
and alternative leadership strategies in greater detail. It evaluates the applicability of 
complexity science to current crises. Having identified the manner in which crises have 
changed, it identifies leadership literature that focuses on current methods of crisis 
leadership. Once the gap between current crises and current crisis leadership has been 
identified, the research pursues alternative approaches to leading in complex crises. The 
analysis is complete when it has examined a number of innovative approaches that may 
address the gap.  
Having articulated how crises have changed, how current leadership methods are 
unequal to the challenge, and what adaptive leadership styles are available, the research 
produces a set of recommendations. The next chapter outlines complexity both past and 
present. 
18 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” 21–33. 
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II. COMPLEXITY 
Abandon the urge to simplify everything, to look for formulas and easy 
answers, and to begin to think multi-dimensionally, to glory in the mystery 
and paradoxes of life, not to be dismayed by the multitude of causes and 
consequences that are inherent in each experience – to appreciate the fact 
that life is complex. 
—M. Scott Peck 
This chapter outlines how contemporary crises are more complex than those of 
past eras by describing the basics of complex systems, their application to modern 
society, and how complexity has, over time, changed the nature of crises. 
A. COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
1. The Basics 
Complex means something composed of parts. Its Latin etymology means to 
weave, braid, or entwine.19 Similarly, complexity involves the intricate arrangement of 
interactive objects through linkages.20 In some instances, these intricacies weave together 
synergistically to create a more formalized result, or system. Complex systems 
demonstrate patterns of behavior whose outcomes, while not necessarily predictable, 
draw attention to the system as a whole in lieu of its individual parts.21  
According to complexity scientists, complex systems possess common properties: 
• They demonstrate complex, dynamic collective behavior. They are 
networks that consist of large numbers of individual, interacting elements 
that give rise to hard-to-predict, changing patterns of behavior.22 
 
 
19 Douglas Harper, “Online Etymology Dictionary,” accessed July 29, 2013, http://www.etymonline. 
com/index.php?term=complex. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative 
Rationality for Public Policy (Oxon, UK; New York, NY: Routledge, 2010). 
22 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 71. 
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• The interactions within a complex system are “nonlinear.” While 
reviewing the behavior of a complex system, it may appear orderly; 
however, it is anything but. Even minor changes within the system can 
produce consequential effects.23  
• Each typically follows relatively simple rules with no central control or 
leader. In other words, some are able to form “leaderless networks.”24 
• They adapt. Over time, complex systems change their behavior to improve 
their chances of survival or success.25 The dynamic nature of complex 
systems makes predictive solutions impossible. Instead, solutions “arise 
from the circumstances.”26 (Also referred to as emergence.) As they adapt, 
their complexity creates an irreversible history.27  
The complex, dynamic, nonlinear, leaderless, adaptive behavior previously 
described is sometimes referred to as self-organizing behavior. Ted Lewis describes self-
organization as “an emergent process of complex systems whereby simplicity is 
gradually replaced by complexity.”28 Having considered elements that comprise a 
complex system and how it demonstrates self-organizing behavior, it may be helpful to 
consider Melanie Mitchell’s simplified definition. She describes it as, “A system that 
exhibits nontrivial emergent and self-organizing behaviors.”29  
2. Examples of Complex Systems 
The natural and synthetic world exhibits examples of complex systems. In nature, 
they are seen in the social organization of ant colonies. With limited capacity for 
communication, ants are able to orchestrate highly complex tasks.30 An astonishing level 
of sophistication arises out of the intricate combination of these simple insect minds. 
23 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 71. 
24 Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 71. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Theodore G. Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile (Williams, CA: Agile Press, 2011), 377. 
29 Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour. 
30 Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Penguin Books, 
Book Club Edition, 1979). 
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Biologist Bert Holldobler refers to the collaborative ant-network as a superorganism that 
demonstrates collective intelligence.31  
The self-organized behavior of army ants is what allows tens of thousands of 
them to cooperatively create body-linked, living bridges on which the group can cross 
over obstacles to safety. Their system-wide, or networked, behavior also allows them to 
aggressively overwhelm prey exponentially larger than themselves. Biologist Nigel 
Franks, a specialist in ants, wrote, “The solitary army ant is behaviorally one of the least 
sophisticated animals imaginable…If 100 army ants are placed on a flat surface, they will 
walk around and around in never decreasing circles until they die of exhaustion.”32 The 
strength of the army ant is not as an individual, but as a complex system.  
A manmade version of a complex system is the World Wide Web. According to 
Mitchell, .”..the Web can be thought of as a self-organizing social system: individuals, 
with little or no central oversight, perform simple tasks: posting Web pages and linking to 
other Web pages…and the co-evolutionary relationships between the behavior of search 
engines and the Web’s link structure, all of which lead to what could be called ‘adaptive’ 
behavior for the system as a whole.”33 The dynamic, nonlinear, leaderless nature of the 
Web demonstrates how it is, in fact, a complex system with which many interact, or to 
which they even contribute, on a daily basis.  
Paul Baran, an early architect of the Internet, contemplated the best way to 
organize it. He believed only three options existed to its design: centralized, 
decentralized, and distributed (Figure 1). Baran “warned that both the centralized and 
decentralized structures that dominated communications systems of the time were too 
vulnerable to attack. Instead, he proposed that the Internet should be designed to have a 
distributed, mesh-like architecture.”34 The “mesh-like architecture” is the complex 
networking system in existence today.  
31 Bert Hölldobler and Edward Osborne Wilson, The Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance, and 
Strangeness of Insect Societies (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2009). 
32 Nigel R. Franks, “Army Ants: A Collective Intelligence,” American Scientist 77 (1989): 139. 
33 Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour, 10. 
34 Barabasi, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and what it Means, 145. 
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Figure 1.  Baran picture of networks35 
Stanley Milgram performed a social networking experiment that resulted in the 
concept known as “six degrees of separation.” Using people as nodes and their friends as 
links, Milgram set out to determine the fewest number of links between any two nodes. In 
other words, using the “friend of a friend” networking model, Milgram discovered that 
any two people in a world of six billion “nodes,” could be connected through a maximum 
of six links.36 In the spirit of Milgram’s work, Albert-Lazlo Barabasi undertook the task 
of identifying how many degrees of separation existed between any two documents on 
the Web. He concluded that the “diameter of the Web” was about nineteen. He wrote, 
“Any document is on average only nineteen clicks away from any other.”37 
According to Barabasi’s math, so many documents are on the Web that a one-
second scan of each document would take over 300 million years to get through.38 The 
significance of Milgram’s and Barabasi’s observations is that networks as expansive as 
the human population or documents on the Web are capable of being connected through 
35 Paul Baran, “On Distributed Communications Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Communications 
Systems 12, no. 1 (1964): 1. 
36 Barabasi, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means. 
37 Ibid., 34. 
38 Ibid., 37. 
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remarkably short, intricately linked paths. It appears that, as Jorge Luis Borges put it, 
“Everything touches everything.”39 
Army ants and the World Wide Web are exemplars of complex systems, but the 
archetype for the adaptive quality of complex systems is the immune system. The very 
function of the immune system is to overcome threats to facilitate survival. Donella 
Meadows observes, “A system that can evolve can survive almost any change, by 
changing itself. The human immune system has the power to develop new responses to 
some kinds of insults it has never before encountered.”40 The immune system is a 
demonstration of how, in a dynamic and nonlinear way, a complex system adapts to its 
environment to survive.  
3. Applying the Principles 
The existence of complex systems is not new. Army ants and the immune system 
did not become collaborative, networking processes within the last few decades. 
However, it appears that 21st century society has more in common with complex systems 
than any civilization in history. Using the lens of complexity and complex systems, it is 
possible to view threats to homeland security in a new way. Bolton and Stolcis write, 
“…we advocate for the increasing acceptance of complex adaptive systems not only in 
the physical and social sciences but in crisis management as well.”41 Using this lens, 
consider how organizations replicate principles of complex systems. 
4. Organizations as Complex Systems 
What previously may not have been recognized as a complex system, can now be 
described in more widely understood terms. Increased familiarity with complexity 
science brings with it the ability to describe the observed behavior more accurately. In his 
book, Linked, Barabasi notes the transformation of terminology after 9/11.  
39 Barabasi, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means, 5. 
40 Donella Meadows and Dianne Wright, Thinking in Systems (White River Jct., VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2008), 159. 
41 Bolton and Stolcis, Overcoming Failure of Imagination in Crisis Management: The Complex 
Adaptive System, 10. 
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A dramatic example of the pervasiveness of this new language came after 
September 11, 2001, when networks acquired a meaning previously 
unfamiliar to most of us. Most of what led to the tragedy makes perfect 
sense from a network perspective. Al Qaeda, the terrorist network held 
responsible for the attacks, was not created in seven days. Driven by 
religious beliefs and impatience with the existing social and political 
order, thousands were drawn to the radical organization over several years. 
The network expanded one node at a time, taking on all the characteristics 
of a web without a spider. Indeed, al Qaeda failed to turn into the hub-and-
spoke network that offers a central leader control over all details. It 
avoided the tree structure as well, the chain of command characterizing the 
military and twentieth-century corporations. Rather, it evolved into a self-
organized spiderless web in which a hierarchy of hubs kept the 
organization together.42 
Using “complex systems thinking,” the interconnected nature of the “al Qaeda 
network” is seen, and it can be understood why, in some cases, cutting the proverbial 
head off the snake may be an inadequate objective.  
Al Qaeda is not the only organization to manipulate the interconnected nature of 
complex systems to corrupt ends. Prior to 9/11, the Lebanon-based terrorist organization, 
Hezbollah, was responsible for more American deaths than any other group.43 Its 
secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, proclaimed, “Death to America was, is, and will stay 
our slogan.”44  
Hezbollah utilizes a swarming, immune system-like method of organization. 
RAND scholars John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt write, “This [swarming] approach is 
based on a general instruction to Hizb’allah’s widely distributed units to converge—like 
antibodies, it seems—on any intruders in a given area. No central leadership is 
required.”45 Hezbollah is leveraging the characteristics of a complex system in its display 
of leaderless, self-organizing behavior. The principles of complex systems are not only 
evident in organizations, but in contemporary crises themselves.  
42 Barabasi, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means, 222. 
43 Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah Be Next?” Foreign Affairs, 2003, 54. 
44 Ibid. 
45 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict, No. RAND/D8-311-OSD 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 52. 
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5. Crises As Complex Systems 
Not all crises are created equal. Complex crises are ill defined, are nearly 
impossible to anticipate, and they produce prolonged periods of disequilibrium. One form 
of complex crises is what Rittel and Weber call “wicked problems.” They write, “As you 
will see, we are calling them ‘wicked’ not because these properties are themselves 
ethically deplorable. We use the term ‘wicked’ in a meaning akin to that of ‘malignant’ 
(in contrast to ‘benign’) or ‘vicious’ (like a circle) or ‘tricky’ (like a leprechaun) or 
‘aggressive’ (like a lion, in contrast to the docility of a lamb).”46  
While the crises of past decades could not be characterized as “simple,” a 
complexity exists in contemporary crises that did not exist, or more accurately, could not 
exist in prior decades. Of note are the technological advances that have become 
commonplace in today’s world within the last 20 years. The year 1995 is considered the 
first year that the Internet became commercialized. Cell phones were not widely used 
until the 2000s and the “mobile web” has only been available since 2007. Google did not 
exist until 1998, Facebook arrived in 2004, and YouTube in 2005.47 The introduction of 
such technologies gave rise to complex crisis opportunities. While a mere infant in the 
scope of history, things, such as Google, iPhones and YouTube, have provided 
opportunities for increased networking, a fertile ground for leaderless networks, and the 
emergence of adaptation in crises.  
Consider Wikileaks, the online, non-profit organization that exists to publicize 
classified information and news leaks. Its first “success” was in 2007, when it published 
detailed military procedures regarding the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay.48 In 2008, 
it leaked “U.S. military rules of engagement in Iraq,” which allowed members of Saddam 
Hussein’s government to escape to neighboring countries.49 For Wikileaks, no single 
46 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4, no. 2 (1973): 160. 
47 Cameron Chapman, “The History of the Internet in a Nutshell,” November 15, 2009, 
http://sixrevisions.com/resources/the-history-of-the-Internet-in-a-nutshell/. 
48 Yochai Benkler, “Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the Soul of the 
Networked Fourth Estate,” 46 Harv.CR-CLL Rev. 311 (2011): 316. 
49 Ibid. 
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individual gathers all the leaked intelligence. It leverages the knowledge and resources of 
a huge number of individuals (networking). No “one iconic leader,” who, if removed, 
would eliminate the threats that created the leaks (leaderless network). If an individual at 
the bottom (a source), or at the top (the CEO) were eliminated, the organization would 
continue. If the organization itself was dismantled, it is likely that another would fill the 
void, and may even become an improved, more complex version (adaptation). 
Another example is the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, India in which 166 were 
killed and 300 wounded over the course of the three-day siege. The terrorists navigated 
across the Arabian Sea to Mumbai using a global positioning system handset. Leading up 
to the attack, they maintained communications with their operational command in 
Pakistan via satellite phone. They were familiar with their targets and the most direct 
routes to them using images from Google Earth. The operatives used voiceover Internet 
phone servers to interact during the attack, which made it difficult for law enforcement to 
intercept or disrupt their communications. In addition, the Pakistani-based handlers 
watched television media coverage and monitored social media in an effort to direct the 
executioners’ movement more effectively to increase the death count.50  
Historic leadership methods are inadequate when it comes to these forms of crisis 
complexity. Early organizational management theory suggested that organizational 
behavior could be controlled through proper leadership. In 1917, one researcher, Henri 
Fayol, wrote, “To manage is to forecast and plan, to organize, to command, to co-
ordinate, and to control.”51 Within the same decade, Frederick W. Taylor wrote, 
“Scientific Management will mean, for the employers and the workmen who adopt it, the 
elimination of almost all causes for dispute and disagreement between them.”52 For them, 
organizational problems were solvable. Administrative solutions were a matter of 
identifying and applying the right formula to achieve the desired outcome. During this 
50 William LaRaia and Michael C. Walker, “The Siege in Mumbai: A Conventional Terrorist Attack 
Aided by Modern Technology,” in A New Understanding of Terrorism, ed. M. R. Haberfeld and Agostino 
von Hassdell (New York, NY: Springer, 2009), 326. 
51 Fayol, Taylor and Drucker, “Management and Decision-Making in Organizations,” 95. 
52 Ibid. 
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era, organizational crises were not viewed as simple, but they lacked the kinds of 
complex qualities possible in the contemporary world. 
Traditional types of planning assume that crises have a measure of predictability 
and, while they may be large in scale, they are still linear in nature. More recently, 
however, it has been acknowledged that many crises (such as those created by Wikileaks 
or those seen in Mumbai) are decidedly complex and not linear events that can be 
“managed” with the right formula. Stability is a passing phase that has been described as 
a “pause in an unmappable dynamism.”53 According to Lagadec and Topper, “Today 
hyper-complex crises demand something else, and probably exactly at the opposite; the 
capacity to ask the tough questions, the preparation to navigate unmapped situations.”54  
Ideally, homeland security leaders would find ways to reduce uncertainties when 
possible without oversimplifying their evaluation of the crisis. A need exists to increase 
the complexity in thinking without irresponsibly reducing the scope of the problem. 
Berkes writes, “We need to discover ways to reduce the degree of uncertainty about the 
dynamics of these complex systems. At the same time, we need to develop new 
approaches to cope with change that cannot be predicted.”55  
In addition to large-scale networking, leaderless networks and adaptation, the 
modern world has introduced novel forms of vulnerability. Contributing to the “hyper-
complexity” of modern crises is the optimization of critical infrastructure. Ted Lewis 
writes, “Modern systems weren’t designed to be resilient, self-correcting, and secure, but 
rather to be low-cost, efficient, and optimized for profitability. As a consequence, the 
critical infrastructures supporting modern civilization have evolved over the centuries 
into fragile, error-prone systems.”56 Lewis points out that, perhaps with the best of 
intentions, this nation is making itself increasingly vulnerable in new and creative ways. 
53 Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and 
What to Do About It, 49. 
54 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” 23. 
55 Berkes, “Understanding Uncertainty and Reducing Vulnerability: Lessons from Resilience 
Thinking,” 285. 
56 Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile, 377. 
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Increased dependence on technology and appetite for efficiency appears to have also 
increased this vulnerability.  
In 2011, a wastewater treatment plant employee arrived for his graveyard shift in 
Gilbert, Arizona. The plant was optimized to the point that a single employee could run 
the operation that spanned a quarter-mile in each direction. The city employee, unhappy 
with political decisions made by government administrators, decided to sabotage the 
plant. He systematically shut down the plant in an effort to create a methane gas buildup 
that he would eventually ignite to create a massive explosion. The man was able to 
single-handedly “take the plant hostage” and prevent anyone else from thwarting his 
actions due to its highly efficient design. The man eventually surrendered with less than 
an hour from the gas building to dangerous proportions and sewage backing up into the 
homes and streets of three different cities. While certainly not the intent of designers, the 
wastewater treatment plant became an oversized object of vulnerability when it was made 
“low-cost, efficient and optimized for profitability.” 
As illustrated by Milgram and Barabasi, people live in a small world. Given the 
right set of circumstances, a relatively short distance exists between any two people, 
documents, strategies, projects, or for that matter, cabals. In a very real sense, 
interconnectedness facilitated by the Internet, social media, and other technologies, has 
made this world even smaller, and not always for the better. Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez notes, 
“Unfortunately, innovation has a dark side. The same accelerated combinatorial evolution 
that empowers entrepreneurs to rapidly improve our high tech environment can, and often 
is, used to harm the innocent.”57  
Today’s networked world creates an environment in which creative convergence 
can facilitate unique criminal acts. The confluence of increased connectivity with 
increased vulnerability is only a portion of what makes today’s crises more complex. No 
example is more poignant than 9/11. 
 
57 Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez, “Preventing the Next 9/10 the Homeland Security Challenges of 
Technological Evolution and Convergence in the Next Ten Years,” Home Security Affairs, 2. 
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On September 11, 2001, “a few” hijackers were able to bring to a halt the 
entire nation, cripple the economy, place continuity of government at risk 
and inflict more than 3000 casualties. The only other occasion when the 
United States suffered comparable losses from a single attack was during 
Pearl Harbor, when the combined fleet of six carrier battle groups (the 
Kido Butai) backed by the full power of the Japanese Empire was 
deployed to accomplish a similar result. In 2001, a cell of nineteen 
hijackers did what only a powerful empire could do in 1941.58 
On 9/11, 19 men from four different countries coordinated the takeover of four 
civilian aircraft with simple box cutters to use the airplanes as missiles to attack the 
United States inside of its own borders, a complex crisis that could not have been 
possible a few decades ago.  
Even after suffering the consequences of 9/11, the United States appears to be ill 
prepared to “navigate unmapped situations.” In its findings, the 9/11 Commission wrote, 
“We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, 
capabilities, and management.”59 In one respect, the observation that this nation failed to 
imagine the method of attack is an admission that creative crises exist; that 9/11 was a 
novel approach. However, the statement implies that this country could (and should) have 
prevented it if only its citizens had been more “imaginative.” What the statement fails to 
consider is that even the most complex event appears obvious with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight. David Snowden writes, “One of the confusing aspects of a complex system is 
that after the event, the relationship between cause and effect appears ordered; it is 
retrospectively coherent. After the tragic events of 911 it appeared obvious that people 
being trained to fly but not to take off and land was a weak signal.”60 
The U.S. government is not ignorant of the complex challenges that face the 
contemporary homeland security environment. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
the Department of Defense wrote, “Globalization has transformed the process of 
58 Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez, “Power of “the Few”: A Key Strategic Challenge for the Permanently 
Disrupted High-Tech Homeland Security Environment,” Home Security Affairs, 37. 
59 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 339. 
60 David Snowden, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors,” Information, Knowledge, Systems 
Management 10, no. 1 (2011): 142. 
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technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wider range of actors to 
develop and acquire advanced technologies. As technological innovation and global 
information flows accelerate, non-state actors will continue to gain influence and 
capabilities that, during the previous century, remained largely the purview of states.”61 
The U.S. government is aware that complexity exists in contemporary crises, but are they 
adequately preparing to lead through them? 
6. What Is Known 
It is known that a familiarity with complex systems improves the understanding of 
many of the threats faced in the modern world. It helps individuals to ask better questions 
in an effort to reach more appropriate answers. Evaluating crises through the eyes of 
complexity science teaches people that even the most wildly imaginative think tank 
cannot envision every possible harmful scenario. Wicked problems exist that simply 
cannot be predicted. While the world may have always presented crises that contained 
more variables than anyone could adequately address, today’s world has ushered in 
opportunities for complexity to which it has never before been exposed. Increased levels 
of large-scale networking, leaderless networks, novel methods of adaptability, and 
unintended vulnerability have changed the game in a short amount of time.  
Using the principles of complexity science to recognize the complexity in 
contemporary crises is a good start, but it is necessary to ask if this nation is leading with 
that in mind. The next chapter examines methods of leadership and how they relate to the 
complexity of contemporary crises.  
61 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2010), 30. 
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III. MALADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP 
My great concern is not whether you have failed, but whether you are 
content with your failure. 
—Abraham Lincoln 
This chapter includes a discussion on “maladaptive leadership.” It describes two 
specific examples of maladaptive leadership in “heroic leadership” and the use of “best 
practices.” It closes with a summary of “what is known” based on the complexity of 
contemporary crises (from the previous section) and the routine exercise of maladaptive 
leadership.  
A. MALADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP  
Ecologist Crawford S. Holling wrote that adaptive capacity is “the resilience of 
the system, a measure of its vulnerability to unexpected or unpredictable shocks. This 
property can be thought of as the opposite of the vulnerability of the system.”62 
Conversely, he described maladaptive systems as ones that suffer from “an impoverished 
state” that can result in “low connectedness, low potential, and low resilience.”63 
Likewise, Joshua Ramo wrote, “Maladaptive systems were doomed because they 
couldn’t change or adjust fast enough in the face of surprise. Ecologists call this situation 
‘lock-in,’ which captures the way in which inflexibility and mistakes become a prison of 
sorts as time goes on.”64 
The author suggests that the contemporary use of traditional leadership is slow to 
recognize the need for organizational change, and as a result, is experiencing lock-in. It 
is, in a sense, demonstrating maladaptive leadership. Its inflexible nature leads to 
increased vulnerability to catastrophic failure, and decreased resilience to complex 
62 Crawford S. Holling, “Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological, and Social 
Systems,” Ecosystems 4, no. 5 (2001): 390–405. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and 
What to Do About It, 285. 
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problems. Like systems, maladaptive leaders experience an impoverished state due to the 
same low connectedness, low potential, and low resilience. Current forms of maladaptive 
leadership are demonstrated in two significant ways, heroic leadership and the 
overreliance on best practices.  
B. HEROIC LEADERSHIP  
As its name indicates, heroic leadership operates on the assumption that the 
individual at the top of an organization will save the day, regardless of the severity of the 
crisis (perhaps even more so when great risk is involved). Hollywood’s portrayal of the 
“hero-leader,” albeit hyperbolic, perpetuates the image of the modern exemplary leader. 
Consider Captain Kirk of the Starship Enterprise. In a standard episode of Star Trek, he 
served as the chief executive of a ship with a crew of 430.65 In addition to his duty to 
superintend an enormous aircraft and a sizable crew, he personally traveled to strange 
lands where he single-handedly resolved the impending catastrophe, only to return to the 
ship’s bridge where he resumed the mundane tasks of day-to-day leadership.  
Like Captain Kirk, the hero-leader’s efficacy is measured in the ability to 
accurately identify crises and adequately apply the appropriate solution. James Spillane 
writes, “…in the heroic leadership tradition, leadership is defined chiefly in terms of its 
outcome.”66 For the hero-leader, the organization knows what the desired outcome is and 
looks for deliverance in its mythical leader. An inability to deliver on expected outcomes 
in the heroic leadership system is seen as a failure of leadership. If the leader is unable to 
deliver the right answers expediently, this person must not be the leader the organization 
needs.  
In the heroic leadership model, subordinates stand at the ready to support the 
leader’s actions and the remainder of the organization is prepared to respond to the 
resulting directives. By and large, success or failure is attributed directly to the leader. 
Annie Pye notes, “Much of early research into leadership implied it was something which 
65 Ben Robinson and Marcus Riley, Star Trek: USS Enterprise: Haynes Manual (San Jose, CA: Simon 
and Schuster, 2010). 
66 Spillane, Distributed Leadership. 
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was ‘done to’ other people. The leader (person) often becomes confused with the 
leadership (process) and outcomes in terms of social influence are often over-attributed to 
the influence of the leader.”67 The focus on outcomes draws a direct line between cause 
and effect, which is further demonstrated in the fact that it “suits our current pay-for-
performance environment.”68 
The maladaptive hero-leader thinks in a formulaic fashion. Through years of 
experience and numerous high-level training courses, he amasses a host of solutions, 
expectantly waiting for the corresponding crisis. Problem solving at this point becomes a 
matter of following a mental matrix. The greater the amount of training and experience, 
the more complex the matrix becomes and the more prepared the leader is to “save the 
day.” However, the use of matrices, regardless of their size and complexity, is still a 
formulaic response that lacks ingenuity or, for that matter, real thinking.  
This “lack of real thinking” about future crises is what philosopher Martin 
Heidegger termed “calculative thinking.”69 Elizabeth Smythe and Andrew Norton write, 
“Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the 
same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to 
the next.”70 They note that, “[Heidegger’s] concern was that thinking itself was being 
dictated to by nothing more than a manipulation of operational concepts, 
representational models, and models of thinking.”71 Calculative thinking assumes a 
simplicity that is irreconcilable with truly complex crises. 
It stands to reason that hero-leaders see crises as scientifically solvable. Since the 
19th and early 20th centuries, management theories have maintained the foundational 
principles of “reductionism, determinism, and equilibrium.”72 Cynthia E. Renaud notes 
67 Annie Pye, “Leadership and Organizing: Sensemaking in Action,” Leadership 1, no. 1 (2005): 34. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1969), 4. 
70 Elizabeth Smythe and Andrew Norton, “Thinking as Leadership/Leadership As Thinking,” 
Leadership 3, no. 1 (2007): 67. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Kevin J. Dooley, “A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization Change,” Nonlinear 
Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences 1, no. 1 (1997): 69–97. 
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that even in homeland security, the ICS has become “a series of checklists and tasks 
tending to focus first responders on process instead of purpose.”73 
Western intellectual habits predate the management theories of the 19th century. 
Ingrained in American society is the Aristotelian notion of being able to “understand 
something only if you could break it apart and examine all the pieces.”74 Margaret 
Wheatley also recognizes the linear method of problem solving may be outdated. 
Scientists in many different disciplines are questioning whether we can 
adequately explain how the world works by using the machine imagery 
emphasized in the seventeenth century by such great geniuses as Sir Isaac 
Newton and René Descartes. This machine imagery leads to the belief that 
studying the parts is the key to understanding the whole. Things are taken 
apart, dissected literally or figuratively (as we have done with business 
functions, academic disciplines, areas of specialization, human body 
parts), and then put back together without any significant loss. The 
assumption is that the more we know about the workings of each piece, 
the more we will learn about the whole.75 
In a unique comparison of Taoism to leadership, Lesley Prince notes that the 
Western way of thinking classifies leadership as a noun “and therefore as a separable 
object of study.”76 In her comparison of the traditions, she writes, “Whereas for the West 
leadership is about active and shaping control, for Taoism it is more about engagement, 
understanding and co-ordination.”77 Again, “Although in the West we recognize the 
distinction, priority is still given to task and instrumental values. As a consequence our 
primary models still present leadership as the heroic exercise of power, and in our 
working lives we have lived with a form of aggressive muscular management...”78 
73 Cynthia E. Ranaud, “Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos: A Framework for Effective Initial 
Response Efforts to Large-Scale Incidents” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 75. 
74 Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and 
What to Do About It, 155. 
75 Margaret J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science: Discovering Order in a Chaotic World 
(San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2010). 
76 Prince, “Eating the Menu Rather than the Dinner: Tao and Leadership,” 105. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 120. 
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For the hero-leader then, leadership has much to do with control. An optimum 
outcome for which the leader strives and the path to that outcome, it seems, looks very 
much like a linear procedure. The exercise of control through procedures, formulas or 
matrices could actually prove to be a hindrance. “The major challenge today is to prepare 
leaders so that the creative approach will prevail at the right moment. Unfortunately, the 
entire organizational, administrative and institutional culture normally tends to fall into 
procedural thinking.”79 
The ideal fit for a hero-leader is a highly centralized organization. In such 
organizations, it is believed that the top leader drives the response to crisis. “In this 
conception of leadership, crisis management consists of planning and control: the plan 
gives rise to effective coordination; leaders manage the coordinated network from their 
crisis centers. When the response is perceived to fail, there is a call for better 
coordination and stronger leadership. The result is more plans, which emphasize further 
centralization of authority: bureaucratic pyramids and a boss-of-the-bosses are supposed 
to forge coordination where it is not forthcoming spontaneously.”80  
The authors of The Politics of Crisis Management also write, “In reality, the 
quality of the crisis response has less to do with planning and top-level control than these 
policies of centralization assume. A truly effective crisis response cannot be forced: it is 
to a large extent the result of a naturally evolving process. It cannot be managed in linear, 
step-by-step and comprehensive fashion from a single crisis center, however full of top 
decision makers and stacked with state-of-the-art information technology.”81  
The hero-leader is never more comfortable than when leading through a crisis for 
which a procedure exists. The writers of Star Trek endowed a single character with the 
deific problem-solving creativity found only in Hollywood scripts. For many, employing 
a heroic leadership mentality can become an all-or-nothing proposition. The complex 
crisis that does not add up for the calculative thinker may have catastrophic results.  
79 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” 27. 
80 Boin, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, 64. 
81 Ibid. 
 27 
                                                 
C. BEST PRACTICES 
“Best practices” is an organizational cliché that brings a sense of comfort to 
leaders. They are methods that serve as benchmarks for things that have been tested and 
subsequently identified as “as good as can be expected.” They are an invitation to assent 
to the status quo. While there is a time and place well suited for best practices, the throes 
of a crisis are not likely to be one. During these times, best practices may not be good 
enough. Snowden and Boone remark, .”..it’s important to remember that best practice is, 
by definition, past practice. Using best practices is common, and often appropriate, in 
simple contexts. Difficulties arise, however, if staff members are discouraged from 
bucking the process even when it’s not working anymore. Since hindsight no longer leads 
to foresight after a shift in context, a corresponding change in management style may be 
called for.”82 
This nation’s methods of leadership appear to be consistent with the adage, “Fool 
me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.” This preoccupation with looking 
backward at past practices in an effort to say “never again” to a specific crisis stifles the 
kinds of innovation and creative problem solving needed to solve the next crisis.  
“Humans have a tendency to behave—almost without exception—as though they 
believe that experience teaches them lessons, in a very cause-consequence, past-present, 
‘linear’ line of thought…We still seem, at every turn, to lack this critical self-awareness, 
this realization that more of the same is not the solution.”83 It is cause-consequence 
thinking that accounts for the 9/11 Commission’s comment, “On the morning of 9/11 the 
existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen.”84 
Similarly, on the heels of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid lamented, “No one knows what to do. We are in a new territory here. This is a 
new game. They don’t know what to do.”85 
82 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 71. 
83 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” 23. 
84 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 18. 
85 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World.” 
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Where heroic leadership oversimplifies the solution, best practices oversimplifies 
the problem. It assumes that an effect (the crisis) has an identifiable cause. It looks 
backward at what happened, distills it to its “root cause,” and then creates a solution to 
that cause. “A common belief is that some set of factors ‘causes’ a crisis…it would be 
more precise to speak of escalatory processes that undermine a social system’s capacity 
to cope with disturbances.”86 
It is naïve to think that in a chaotic crisis, a single best way would solve the 
problem. It is improbable that a best practice exists that a hero-leader can reference that 
will save the day. Consequently, when complex crises do not fit the best practices mold, 
it can lead to inaction on the part of maladaptive leaders. Erwan Lagadec writes:  
As soon as crisis erupts, collective intelligence somehow finds itself 
paralyzed; and communication becomes impossible, while leadership 
vanishes. Officials grab for dear life onto basic tools that they were taught 
would work. This reflects the prevalent tendency in the training of leaders: 
as their teachers adopt a magisterial posture, claiming to hold, and divulge, 
all the right answers, the right tools, ‘what you are going to do.’ And then 
leaders go home with a thick file of ‘best practices,’ and they think ‘it’s all 
in there’: but it doesn’t work!—because these ready-made tools will be 
circumvented and made irrelevant by crisis.87 
Maladaptive leaders maintain a mental, or even real, Rolodex of solutions that 
represents a kind of “guarantee” against catastrophic failure until, of course, a crisis 
occurs for which no past practice to reference is available. It is then that leaders move 
quickly from a position of confidence and security to that of a powerless victim. Lagadec 
writes, “Piling up written plans, rules, ‘coordination’ committees and ‘communication’ 
best practices remains the norm. People are prepared to manage according to solid rules, 
anchored on solid ground, and selected for their ‘inside the box’ excellence. As soon as 
people discover that the situation does not correspond to the nominal framework, they 
tend to suffer instant paralysis and breakdown.”88 
86 Boin, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure, 5. 
87 Erwan Lagadec, “Unconventional Crises, Unconventional Responses: Reforming Leadership in the 
Age of Catastrophic Crises and Hypercomplexity,” Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze 
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2007, 127. 
88 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” 27. 
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Recent attempts to implement greater levels of hierarchy to already highly 
centralized organizations are testimonies to this country’s reliance on heroic leadership 
and best practices. The creation and implementation of the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence illustrates Congress’ 
expectation that an additional layer of control will make the nation safer. In other words, 
if  federal organizations have the right leader (a hero-leader) possessing all the right 
information (best practices), it is then possible to secure the nation more effectively. 
While day-to-day responsibilities of those organizations may, in fact, enhance national 
security, the idea that additional layers of authority requiring higher degrees of 
centralization will provide improved leadership in crisis is flawed. 
The standard administrative approach to solving complex problems has 
been to organize work involving multiple agents and tasks hierarchically. 
Hierarchy is used to establish control, specify tasks, allocate 
responsibilities and reporting procedures, and presumably gain reliability 
and efficiency in workflow. This approach works reasonably well in 
routine circumstances when there is time to plan actions, train personnel, 
identify problems, and correct mistakes. Under the urgent, dynamic 
conditions of disaster, however, such procedures almost always fail.89 
Lagadec and Topper use science to analogize the phenomenon. “In physics, 
dealing with complex systems usually starts with trying to linearize the equations 
involved, i.e., getting rid of the complexity…we argue that the way we are currently 
dealing with a crisis is similar to that over-simplified approach, but that recent major 
crises indicate that it has become ineffective.”90  
D. WHAT IS KNOWN 
It is known that contemporary crises have become increasingly complex and that 
many leadership paradigms have not accommodated that transition. It is not that people 
are incapable of leading through crises effectively, but that traditional, maladaptive 
methods of leadership are inadequate for accomplishing it. To that end, Margaret 
Wheatley writes, “I no longer believe that organizations are inherently unmanageable in 
89 Louise K. Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism and Other Extreme 
Events,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 32, no. 4 (2002): 33. 
90 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” 24. 
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this world of constant flux and unpredictability. Rather, I believe that our present ways of 
organizing are outmoded, and that the longer we remain entrenched in our old ways, the 
further we move from those wonderful breakthroughs in understanding that the world of 
science calls ‘elegant.’”91 
What is needed, therefore, is to find ways to avoid leading in a maladaptive 
fashion. Leadership tools are needed that incorporate more creativity and risk taking, and 
more organizations that inculcate the habit of resourceful leading. In “Overcoming 
Failure of Imagination in Crisis Management,” the authors express concern that 
“catastrophic danger to homeland security predictably will increase as long as leaders 
resist exploring ingenious, and heretofore untried management approaches in preventing 
them.”92 
Smythe and Norton also agree with the need for innovation. They write, “The 
experience of ‘being’ a leader is complex, uncertain and contradictory. Pre-organized, 
logical, follow-the-plan thinking is not enough in itself. There needs to be attentiveness, 
attunement and openness to the not-yet-known, all of which are already there in thinking 
that simply let’s thinking think.”93  
It appears that maladaptive leadership is the status quo of contemporary 
leadership. Ingenious, untried management approaches that are attentive to the not-yet-
known are needed. What is needed is adaptive leadership. 
91 Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science: Discovering Order in a Chaotic World, 5. 
92 Bolton and Stolcis, “Overcoming Failure of Imagination in Crisis Management: The Complex 
Adaptive System,” 8. 
93 Smythe and Norton, “Thinking as Leadership/Leadership As Thinking,” 67. 
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IV. ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP 
Do what you can, with what you have, where you are. 
—Theodore Roosevelt 
This chapter describes adaptive leadership and explores two foundational 
principles vital to its successful exercise. Specifically, it examines sensemaking in crises 
and the establishment of objectives.  
A. ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP—WHAT IT IS 
“Adaptive” conveys the idea of transforming to accommodate a dynamic 
environment.94 Likewise, “adaptive leadership” is the ability of a leader to recognize the 
dynamic nature of a complex crisis and alter the leader’s thinking (and leading) 
accordingly.  
An adaptive leader deals with the immediate needs of a crisis, but not at the 
expense of long-term objectives. In their book entitled, The Practice of Adaptive 
Leadership, authors Ronald Abadian Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Martin Linsky use 
the analogy of a party. While on the dance floor, the host is led to believe that the 
celebration is going well. From this perspective, partygoers are laughing, dancing, and 
thoroughly enjoying the festivities. However, a view from the balcony reveals that the 
music is so loud that everyone is relegated to one side of the room. As the music changes, 
many people stop dancing. Others are disengaged entirely from the event and are 
standing near the exits.95 A change in perspective from intimate participant to attentive 
overseer makes for an entirely different analysis of the situation.  
Adaptive leaders have a “balcony view.” They maintain a vantage point that 
allows them to focus on finding solutions to the “long game” and not on being a hero-
94 Nick Obolensky, Complex Adaptive Leadership (London, UK: Gower Publishing Company, 
Limited, 2010). 
95 Ronald Abadian Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Martin Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive 
Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World (Boston, MA: Harvard 
Business Press, 2009). 7. 
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leader for the short one. An adaptive leader recognizes the complexity in a complex crisis 
and understands that calculative thinking will not solve it. They recognize the need for 
“ingenious, untried management approaches” and seek opportunities to apply them. 
Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky describe the gap filled with adaptive leadership. They 
write, “What is needed from a leadership perspective are new forms of improvisational 
expertise, a kind of process expertise that knows prudently how to experiment with 
never-been-tried-before relationships, means of communication, and ways of interacting 
that will help people develop solutions that build upon and surpass the wisdom of today’s 
experts.”96 
As it relates to this research, adaptive leadership is leadership that accurately 
recognizes a complex crisis and leads through the resulting state of disequilibrium using 
combinations of conventional and innovative solutions where appropriate. Further, 
adaptive leadership looks both forward and back to evaluate the effectiveness of applied 
solutions and searches for new ones as the crisis unfolds. That said, the first step in 
dealing with any complex crisis is making some sense out of it.  
B. SENSEMAKING IN CRISIS 
“Sensemaking,” as its name indicates, is an effort to make something sensible 
(i.e., to be able to apply some level of understanding to it).97 Ironically, making sense of 
something new and unusual requires reflection on what has been previously experienced. 
To that end, Karl Weick wrote, “people can know what they are doing only after they 
have done it.”98 What occupies the space between the new and complex and “been-there, 
done-that” is a realm of uncertainty and potential. It is that space that demands adaptive 
leadership.  
Adaptive leaders have to be comfortable with that space, with the unknown. 
Decision making is typically better when more information is available, but an adaptive 
96 Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for 
Changing Your Organization and the World, 2. 
97 Pye, “Leadership and Organizing: Sensemaking in Action,” 38. 
98 Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, vol. 3 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 49. 
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leader has the courage to act in spite of confusion and misinformation. In How Crises 
Model the Modern World, the authors note the tendency toward inaction for many leaders 
in these contexts.  
Leaders should be mentally prepared to take an approach to intelligence 
and action that is more creative than procedural. The problem is that our 
habits at times of emergency and crisis are usually just the opposite. With 
very little information available and even less of it verified, the leader 
must have the conviction and the vision to lead the community out of its 
initial disorientation, and to avoid the two pitfalls that are always present 
in extreme crises: bureaucratic inertia (where each organization waits until 
the crisis fits its codes and rules), and the general loss of nerve (not only 
within the public, but throughout the entire chain of command).99 
Operating in uncertainty does not mean that adaptive leaders must be able to 
accomplish everything using nothing. It means that complex crises call for more complex 
solutions than the traditionally available tools. It means leaders need to look at their 
current resources in a new way. Snowden poignantly illustrates the difference between 
many of today’s leaders and an adaptive leader using the metaphor of a chef and his 
kitchen. 
If you employ a recipe book user to cook a meal for you, then your kitchen 
will have to be engineered to match a standard design. All the ingredients 
will be lined up in appropriate sized bowls and, as long as nothing 
unexpected happens you will get a reasonable meal. The Chef on the other 
hand enters your kitchen and creates a wonderful meal from whatever 
happens to be lying around. This is not to say that recipe books do not 
have utility, or that the chef will not use them from time to time.100 
Sensemaking is the ability to move from recipe book user to chef. It is the ability 
to recognize the complexity of the crisis and to diagnose it appropriately. Heifetz, 
Grashow, and Linksy claim that the skill of diagnosing is the most important, but 
“undervalued capacity” of adaptive leadership.101 Adaptive leadership requires a 
willingness to accept the circumstances at hand and to operate within them or to make 
99 Lagadec and Topper, “How Crises Model the Modern World,” 28. 
100 Snowden, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors,” 136. 
101 Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for 
Changing Your Organization and the World, 7. 
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decisions in spite of a lack of resources and information. During the uncertainty created 
by complex crises, it may not be helpful to create a new “comfort zone,” but to identify 
ways to even advance or succeed during the chaotic circumstance. Ramo notes that in 
these situations “the key words are breadth of thinking; the willingness to learn and 
innovate; appetite for risk; being prepared to confront the inevitable; and having a very 
good supporting process that allows decisions to be made at a pace that meets the speed 
of the disruption.”102 Innovation, risk, confronting the inevitable, and making decisions 
at the pace that meets the speed of disruption, is the antithesis of maladaptive leadership. 
It is leading with eyes and mind wide open.  
At the outset, adaptive leaders must make sense of the environment in which they 
have been thrust by wisely interpreting the context of the situation. In the complexity of 
contemporary crises, adaptive leaders may need to “act against their instincts.”103 A 
healthy sense of context will allow adaptive leaders to show flexibility in leadership style 
and in the use of resources, knowing “when to look to the wisdom of the group and when 
to take his own counsel.”104 
Consider the contrasting response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill by two 
leaders involved in the crisis, BP chief executive officer Tony Hayward, and U.S. Coast 
Guard Admiral Thad Allen. The disaster was the largest oil spill in history, with an 
estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil released into the Gulf of Mexico from a sea-floor oil 
gusher unable to be stopped for 87 days. The event occurred in April 2010 when the oil 
rig Deepwater Horizon exploded and sunk, killing eleven people.105  
After it began, CEO Tony Hayward reportedly told other BP executives, “What 
the hell did we do to deserve this?”106 During the crisis, he made the claim that the spill 
102 Lagadec, Unconventional Crises, Unconventional Responses: Reforming Leadership in the Age of 
Catastrophic Crises and Hypercomplexity, 128. 
103 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 76. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Yonggang Liu et al., “Tracking the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: A Modeling Perspective,” Eos 
Trans. AGU 92, no. 6 (2011): 45–52. 
106 Benjamin Snyder, “Tony Hayward’s Greatest Hits,” CNN.Com, June 10, 2010, 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/10/news/companies/tony_hayward_quotes.fortune/2010. 
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was “relatively tiny” compared to the “very big ocean.”107 In addition, he later told 
reporters, “We’re sorry for the massive disruption it’s caused their lives. There is no one 
who wants this over more than I do. I would like my life back.”108 In short, in the face of 
a complex crisis, Hayward viewed himself as a victim, he minimized the problem, and 
demonstrated self-pity.  
Conversely, Admiral Thad Allen was tasked with serving as the National Incident 
Commander for the oil spill. In an interview with the Harvard Business Review, he was 
asked if he viewed the undertaking as a military operation. He commented that it was 
more complex than a military operation and that he needed a “whole of government 
response.” Specifically, he stated, “You have to aggregate everybody’s capabilities to 
achieve a single purpose, taking into account the fact that they have distinct authorities 
and responsibilities. That’s creating unity of effort rather than unity of command, and it’s 
a much more complex management challenge.”109 Later, he articulated the need for a 
“balcony view” when he said, “You have to understand at a very large, macro level what 
the problem is that you’re dealing with and what needs to be done to achieve the effects 
you want—and you have to be able to communicate that. You also have to create a set of 
shared values that everybody involved can subscribe to.” Allen experienced greater 
success because he employed a sensemaking skill from the outset of the scenario. He 
recognized the context of the situation; he used the resources available to him, and 
avoided the pitfall of “a general loss of nerve.”  
Sensemaking serves the adaptive leader well as the first step in leading through 
disequilibrium. However, it is through the establishment of objectives that conclusions 
resulting from sensemaking experience are effectively communicated.  
107 Tim Webb, “BP Boss Admits Job on the Line Over Gulf Oil Spill,” The Guardian, sec. 14, 2010. 
108 Snyder, Tony Hayward’s Greatest Hits. 
109 Scott Berinato and Thad Allen, “You Have to Lead from Everywhere,” Harvard Business Review 
88, no. 11 (2010): 76–79. 
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C. ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES 
Innovative, flexible, non-linear approaches to leadership may be the key to 
successfully navigating future crises, but foundational principles upon which all leaders 
must operate need to be applied if they hope to be adaptive leaders. The first is their role 
in establishing objectives. Daniel Mills purports that, “Without leadership a group of 
human beings quickly degenerates into argument and conflict, because we see things in 
different ways and lean toward different solutions. Leadership helps to point us in the 
same direction and harness our efforts jointly.”110 Moving in the same direction requires 
a director and a set of common goals and objectives. 
As it relates to adaptive leadership, the principles of flexibility and versatility are 
not completely independent of constraints. A goal must exist toward which effort is 
invested and that goal needs to be set by someone. An adaptive leader is first a leader. A 
leader who hopes to mobilize followers must be clear about what the priorities are for the 
organization. Similar to the architectural principle that form follows function, an adage in 
organizational theory states, “structure follows strategy.”111 Decision making by the 
adaptive leader needs to be done with the most important objectives serving as the 
guiding principles.112  
Leaders who seek to be adaptive need to focus their efforts on organizational 
priorities prior to crises and to practice correlating those to the highest priorities within 
the crises themselves. They need to hone the ability to disregard everything except what 
leads to accomplishing the goals. Lagadec laments, “Today we are dealing with leaders 
who, most often, no longer know how to clarify situations; who cannot identify the crux 
of an issue; who cannot define priorities—they always deal with emergencies, but have 
lost the ability to establish priorities.”113 
110 Daniel Quinn Mills, Leadership: How to Lead, How to Live (Waltham, MA: MindEdge Press, 
2005), 11. 
111 Michael E. Raynor, The Strategy Paradox: Why Committing to Success Leads to Failure (and 
What to Do About It) (Random House Digital, Inc., 2007). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Lagadec, Unconventional Crises, Unconventional Responses: Reforming Leadership in the Age of 
Catastrophic Crises and Hypercomplexity, 126. 
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To the degree that adaptive leaders must establish the objectives that will unify 
and mobilize efforts, the leader must also be an effective communicator of those 
objectives. Policies, procedures and organizational charts will be of little help in a 
complex crisis if leaders fail to communicate effectively “what it is they are fighting for” 
and “what the endgame will look like.”114  
Hurricane Katrina serves as an example of how the lack of clear objectives, or the 
inability to communicate those objectives effectively, was a significant obstacle to 
effective emergency response. Establishing objectives is one of the core tenets of the 
National Incident Management System (created by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency).115 However, an after action review of Hurricane Katrina by the White House 
revealed an inability to do that very thing.116 
In the end, objectives were identified, documented, and published in the form of 
the daily Incident Action Plan distributed to emergency responders.117 However, in the 
time it took crisis leaders to overcome the obstacle, it had become a political nightmare. 
The American Dialect Society reported that the word “Katrinagate” was runner-up for the 
word that best defined 2005.118 Establishing and communicating objectives early, 
matters. 
D. WHAT IS KNOWN 
Adaptive leadership recognizes complexity, it seeks resourceful solutions and 
reflects on their effects. The complexity of contemporary crises amplifies the need for 
adaptive leadership. Adaptive leaders need to have the courage to accept they will be 
making decisions in an imperfect and poorly resourced situation. To the degree possible, 
114 Lagadec, Unconventional Crises, Unconventional Responses: Reforming Leadership in the Age of 
Catastrophic Crises and Hypercomplexity, 107. 
115 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System (New York, NY: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011). 121. 
116 The White House, “Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned,” accessed November 7, 2013, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html. 
117 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina Incident Action Plan (New York, 
NY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005), 2. 
118 Heather Clark, “Linguists Vote ‘Truthiness’ Word of 2005,” ABC News, January 6, 2006, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060325135124/http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=1480616. 
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they must make sense of the scenario as it is, and demonstrate a willingness to look for 
innovative solutions to unique circumstances. At its root, adaptive leadership requires the 
ability to set objectives and to communicate those effectively throughout the 
organization. That said, sensemaking and the setting of objectives is not enough. An 
adaptive leader needs to elicit and employ innovative and complex solutions. They need 
alternative strategies.  
 40 
V. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 
All great deeds and all great thoughts have ridiculous beginnings. 
—Albert Camus 
This chapter affirms the need for alternative strategies with a brief description of 
the strategy paradox. Two alternative strategies are proposed that comport with adaptive 
leadership, namely, distributed leadership and parallel processing.  
A. THE STRATEGY PARADOX 
The premise of the strategy paradox is that the “strategies with the greatest 
possibility of success also have the greatest possibility of failure.”119 In his book, The 
Strategy Paradox, Michael Raynor theorizes that leaders make strategies to succeed 
based on what they believe the future holds. Any variation from their prognosticating 
calculations results in catastrophic failure. Little to no place exists for uncertainty or 
allowances made for adaptation to it. Leaders commit to a particular course of action in 
the belief they are mitigating risk through the commitment itself, but in reality, are 
forcing themselves into an all or nothing scenario.120  
As its name indicates, an alternative strategy is one not considered a best practice, 
and as such, assumes some level of risk. However, the strategy paradox suggests that risk 
is the soil in which great ideas take root. Of note is Raynor’s proposition regarding the 
risk of no risk. “The very traits we have come to identify as determinants of high 
achievement are also the ingredients of total collapse. And so it turns out that, 
behaviorally at least, the opposite of success is not failure, but mediocrity.”121 
Mediocrity, it seems, is the best-case scenario for maladaptive leaders (despite the 
best of intentions). Once victimized by a complex crisis, maladaptive leaders affirm the 
119 Raynor, The Strategy Paradox: Why Committing to Success Leads to Failure (and What to Do 




                                                 
“never again” vow and commit wholeheartedly to memorizing the newest edition of best 
practices. After 9/11, the U.S. government vowed never to be the victim of hijacked 
airliners. To that end, it created a new form of “best practices” through the formation of 
the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA). According to a congressional report, the 
original structure of the TSA would “provide the agency with the capacity to connect the 
dots between intelligence analysis and security performance.”122 While a lofty goal 
indeed, the same report listed a host of problems 10 years after its inception. First among 
the key findings was that the “TSA lacks administrative competency and is made 
inefficient by its massive bureaucracy.” Additionally, it reported, “the status and mission 
of TSA have gradually eroded to make the agency a tangential and inert unit within 
DHS’s massive structure.”123 The well-intentioned sense of “never again” as it relates to 
the safety of air travel did not translate into a preparation for uncertainty. The burgeoning 
federal agency (400 percent growth in 10 years)124 does not appear to be in the business 
of institutionalizing risk-taking processes to prepare for the unknown.  
Returning to Lesley Prince’s comparison of Taoism and leadership, she writes, 
“To be free from convention is not to spurn it but not to be deceived by it. It is to be able 
to use it as an instrument rather than be used by it. This suggests that a willingness to step 
outside the rules may be an important feature of leadership.”125 Employing alternative 
strategies requires a shift in thinking and a change of organizational cultures. Rules and 
regulations serve an important purpose, but alternative strategies are needed that push 
standard operating procedures to their limits, or even beyond them. Many of the greatest 
leaders in military history were considered “incorrigibly eccentric.”126 Likewise, 
adaptive leadership may call for some shades of eccentricity.  
Perhaps, the best way to summarize the strategy paradox’s assertion about the 
need to embrace uncertainty is through the Albert Einstein quote, “If you do what you’ve 
122 John L. Mica, “A Decade Later: A Call for TSA Reform,” accessed February 7, 2014, 
http://trid.trb.org/view.aspx?id=1125593, 5. 
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126 Ibid. 
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always done, you’ll get what you’ve always gotten.”127 Adaptive leaders want more than 
what they have gotten. They do not want to play the victim and search for new best 
practices. Therefore, on the heels of recognizing complexity (through sensemaking and 
establishing objectives), is the need to employ resourceful solutions. Just as Snowden’s 
chef did not create a culinary masterpiece from nothing, thus, innovative solutions do not 
have to be imagined at the time of the crisis. Measures can be taken to provide the 
“ingredients” for successful leadership through disequilibrium. Adaptive leaders can 
stock the kitchen with processes that set them up for success. What follows are two such 
examples in distributed leadership and parallel processing.  
B. DISTRIBUTED LEADERSHIP  
1. General Principles 
Distributed leadership is the antithesis to heroic leadership. It is a non-linear and 
decentralized method of looking at leadership that advances a healthier, more fully 
developed approach to decision making. In his book, Distributed Leadership, James 
Spillane writes, “I develop a distributed perspective on leadership as an alternative to 
accounts that equate leadership with the gallant acts of one or more leaders in an 
organization.”128 Distributed leadership is not about individual actions or calculative 
thinking, but a culture of leading developed within an organization. Spillane applies the 
principles to the educational field, “But a distributed perspective on leadership should 
first be just that—a perspective or lens for thinking about leadership before rushing to 
normative action. In this view, distributed leadership is not a blueprint for doing school 
leadership more effectively. It is a way to generate insights into how leadership can be 
practiced more or less effectively. A distributed perspective on leadership is best thought 
of as a framework for thinking about and analyzing leadership. It’s a tool for helping us 
think about leadership in new and unfamiliar ways.”129 
127 Elijah Bartini, Motivational, Inspirational and Success Quotes-to Get Motivated Every Day, 
(LunaBulle, 2013). 
128 Spillane, Distributed Leadership. 
129 Ibid. 
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Thinking about leadership in new and unfamiliar ways is the hallmark of adaptive 
leadership. Distributed leadership, as a framework, is not simply the sharing of decision-
making responsibilities among many people. While that may occur to some extent, it is 
only a piece of the distributed leadership model. That piece is sometimes referred to as 
the “leader-plus” method of leading. “A distributed perspective on leadership involves 
two aspects: the leader-plus aspect and the practice aspect. While the leader-plus aspect is 
vital, it is insufficient on its own. The leadership practice aspect moves the focus from 
aggregating the actions of individual leaders to the interactions among leaders, followers, 
and their situation.”130 
In opposition to the traditional method of identifying or developing mythical 
leadership attributes in individual leaders, the distributed leadership model focuses on the 
relationships among leaders and followers. It recognizes the needs of the top leaders and 
simultaneously values the strengths of line employees in an effort to leverage their 
interconnectedness to meet the demands of the crisis. It is an organic model that utilizes 
multiple methods of leading.  
People frequently use the terms collaborative leadership, shared 
leadership, co-leadership, democratic leadership, situational leadership, 
and distributed leadership interchangeably. Sometimes distributed 
leadership is discussed as though it were the same as or a type of 
transformational leadership. From my point of view, this is wrong; they 
are not synonyms. A distributed perspective on leadership is a relative, not 
a replica of these constructs or approaches. While collaborative leadership 
is by definition distributed, all distributed leadership is not necessarily 
collaborative. Indeed, a distributed perspective allows for leadership that 
can be more collaborative or less collaborative, depending on the 
situation.131 
2. Partnerships 
While distributed leadership is not synonymous with collaborative, shared, or 
democratic forms of leadership, one thing is certain—the core of distributed leadership in 
crisis is the effective use of partnerships. Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch note, “examining 
130 Spillane, Distributed Leadership. 
131 Ibid. 
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leadership at the edge of chaos moves the analysis from studying the combined impact of 
context and leadership on performance to examining the co-evolutionary dynamics 
among the environment of the firm, its viability in the setting and its collective 
leadership.”132 
Interestingly, adaptive leaders may find that they increase their ability to lead 
effectively through the greater use of partnerships. Becoming less territorial and more 
intentionally cooperative may facilitate creative solutions and increase a base of power 
from which crises may be overcome. Innes and Booher articulate the benefits of 
partnerships in their book, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative 
Rationality for Public Policy. 
These collaborative efforts can and often do produce significant 
agreements. These agreements may be the least of the consequences, 
however, as the processes themselves build capacity for self-management 
in communities, improve policy knowledge, and create innovative 
strategies tailor-made to the unique conditions of particular situations. 
They can transform intractable problems into tractable ones as participants 
come to see in new ways and develop new values and goals and a sense of 
common purpose. They build social, political and intellectual capital that 
can be used not only for the immediate problem, but for much more over 
time. They can empower previously invisible players, giving them a place 
at the table for the first time. They are a key part of the phenomenon of 
governance, which has gained attention in recent years as increasingly 
hierarchical government is supplemented by the activities of a shifting 
panoply of players linked to one another through networks.133 
Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch term this newly forming method of coordination 
“collaborative rationality.”134 It is a method of making sense, making plans, and making 
decisions by intentionally attributing value to all the parties involved, regardless of their 
organizational base of power.135 While it may fly in the face of conventional thinking, 
diversity can be a strength even in the throes of a complex crisis. Unique crises call for 
132 Richard N. Osborn, James G. Hunt, and Lawrence R. Jauch, “Toward a Contextual Theory of 
Leadership,” The Leadership Quarterly 13, no. 6 (2002): 823. 
133 Innes and Booher, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for 
Public Policy, 7. 
134 Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch, “Toward a Contextual Theory of Leadership,” 797–837. 
135 Ibid. 
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creative solutions. “During times of uncertainty, leaders must enlist a diverse group of 
highly skilled people but ask them to leave behind preconceived notions and prepackaged 
solutions. Those specialists need to understand that no matter how experienced they 
might be, they have never before faced the challenge at hand. The group needs to explore, 
experiment, and invent together, and to integrate deep knowledge and ideas—not just 
apply them. People have to work in fluid, shifting arrangements, rotating in and out of 
teams as the demands of the situation evolve.”136 
The diversity of a group that needs to “explore, experiment, and invent together” 
to solve complex crises should include participants at many levels of leadership. A 
distributed leadership method of employing adaptive leadership principles is not to create 
partnerships exclusively with other executives. A healthy cadre of partnerships includes a 
vertical aspect in addition to a horizontal one. After all, no one can predict from where 
the best combination of answers will come. Berkes recognizes that establishing 
partnerships may be out of the ordinary. He writes, “The creation of governance systems 
with multilevel partnerships is a fundamental shift from the usual top–down approach to 
management. It responds to the need for building resilience by using cross-scale thinking 
and partnerships.”137 Osborn, Hung and Jauch corroborate the premise, “We are 
suggesting that order, cohesion and viability may emerge from the middle and bottom. 
Rather than just focusing on top management and its choices, at the edge of chaos one 
must look at the whole system and its leadership.”138 
The recipe for success in such a heterogeneous group is the application of what 
Spillane calls “heedfulness.” He explains that in settings committed to distributed 
leadership, everyone treats the others heedfully when they act “carefully, intelligently, 
136 Faaiza Rashid, Amy C. Edmondson, and Herman B. Leonard, “Leadership Lessons from the 
Chilean Mine Rescue,” Harvard Business Review 91, no. 7 (2013): 116. 
137 Berkes, “Understanding Uncertainty and Reducing Vulnerability: Lessons from Resilience 
Thinking,” 291. 
138 Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch, “Toward a Contextual Theory of Leadership,” 823. 
 46 
                                                 
purposefully, and attentively.”139 He asserts that the greater amount of heedfulness 
demonstrated within the group, the “more capable the group is of intelligent practice.”140 
The response to the 2011 Joplin, Missouri tornado is an example of the effective 
use of partnerships. The mile-wide tornado killed 158 people, injured some 1,150 others, 
and caused $2.8 billion in damage.141 The response included federal, state, and local 
emergency management professionals in addition to numerous non-governmental 
organizations and volunteer groups. Collaboration had been established prior to the crisis 
through “exercises, training, and other preparedness activities that built regional 
resources and capacity.”142 While many disasters necessitate a high level of cooperation 
among these groups, Missouri experienced greater success because it leveraged regional 
partnerships that had been established in advance. The State of Missouri was able to 
recover more effectively using regional assets in lieu of relying on the federal 
government to take over the management of its crisis.  
An after action report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency noted, 
“The Whole Community response to the Joplin tornado was built upon the preparedness 
structures and activities that Joplin, Jasper County, and its regional partners had spent 
years constructing. Had the region, along with the State and FEMA, not made these 
investments, the response to the tornado would not have achieved this degree of 
effectiveness.”143  
3. Leader Interaction 
Partnerships are about getting the right people together and creating an 
environment in which each is encouraged to contribute. However, another aspect of 
distributed leadership exists that is, perhaps, more art than science. Distributed leadership 
139 Spillane, Distributed Leadership. 
140 Ibid. 
141 United States Department of Commerce, NWS Central Region Service Assessment Joplin, 
Missouri, Tornado—May 22, 2011 (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2011). 
142 Federal Emergency Management Agency, The Response to the 2011 Joplin, Missouri, Tornado 
Lessons Learned Study (New York, NY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011). 
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gives credence to the betweenness of leaders in addition to individual contributions. 
Spillane notes, “Thinking about leadership in terms of interactions rather than actions 
offers a distinctly different perspective on leadership practice. Actions are still important, 
but they must be understood as part of interactions.”144 
In Leadership and the New Science: Discovering Order in a Chaotic World, 
Wheatley expresses her personal feelings about the importance of a focus on interactions. 
She writes, “It is hard to open ourselves to a world of inherent orderliness. In life, the 
issue is not control, but dynamic connectedness. I want to act from that knowledge. I 
want to trust in this universe so much that I give up playing God. I want to stop 
struggling to hold things together. I want to experience such security that the concept of 
‘allowing’—trusting that the appropriate forms will emerge—ceases to be scary. I want 
to surrender my fear of the universe and join with everyone I know in an organization 
that opens willingly to its environment, participating gracefully in the unfolding dance of 
order.”145  
The concepts expressed by Wheatley are congruent with those of distributed 
leadership. She describes her desire to abandon a rigid sense of control to gain real order 
through interconnectedness.  
Interconnectedness acknowledges the organic nature of relationships among 
leaders. “What a leader does influences and in turn is influenced by other leaders. In this 
situation, leadership practice is a system of interacting practices that is more than the sum 
of the actions of individual leaders. A distributed perspective involves examining how 
leadership practice takes shape in the interactions among the practices of these leaders. 
Leadership is a system of practice made up of a collection of interacting component parts 
in relationships of interdependence in which the group has distinct properties over and 
above the individuals who make it up.”146 From a distributed leadership approach, 
leaders examine their decisions in light of how it will affect others. Ideally, they will have 
144 Spillane, Distributed Leadership. 
145 Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science: Discovering Order in a Chaotic World, 25. 
146 Spillane, Distributed Leadership. 
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had an eye for the complexity of those relationships prior to the handling of a crisis. The 
solutions, in such a case, are increasingly mindful (or heedful) of their effect on others. 
The Yarnell Hill (Arizona) wildfire serves as an example of the importance of the 
leader-interaction dynamic. On June 30, 2013, the fire took an unexpected turn that 
claimed the lives of 19 firefighters. The resulting crisis had many complicating factors.  
• It was one of the largest firefighting tragedies in U.S. history 
• The decimated 20-man hotshot crew consisted of members from small, 
local communities 
• The main memorial service included numerous dignitaries, such as Vice 
President Joe Biden, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, and many others 
• Nineteen additional, individual, local memorial arrangements were 
necessary 
• Fire, emergency medical services (EMS) and law enforcement from 
dozens of agencies were needed to assist with everything from ongoing, 
routine calls for service to the transport of victims’ bodies to the 
management of enormous requests for public information 
• The wildfire was still burning147 
In this situation, having the right leaders together was only the first step in 
ameliorating the crisis. It called for an exceedingly high level of cooperation and 
sensitivity. Who was chosen to make what decisions at what time became as important as 
the decisions themselves. Leaders at all levels wanted to make a valuable contribution to 
the effort, but a significant ripple effect affected each decision. The most pedestrian 
decision could not be made without having an impact on another decision maker. The 
network of leaders, logistics, and emotion confined to a relatively small space was the 
recipe for a complex crisis. Key to any success was being adaptive, while maintaining a 
keen awareness of how each leader connected and interacted with the others. 
In the article, “Toward a Contextual Theory of Leadership,” the authors articulate 
the danger of leaders circling the wagons during crises. “At the edge of chaos, the more 
tightly constrained the direct linkages within the corporate elite and the more tightly 
constrained the direct linkages with and across the firm’s inter-organizational field (a) the 
147 Arizona State Forestry Division, “Yarnell Hill Fire,” accessed December 2, 2013, 
http://www.inciweb.org/incident/3461/. 
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lower the firm’s impact on its inter-organizational field and (b) the more likely the firm 
will experience repeated unanticipated negative and increasingly dire consequences in 
attempts to alter its positioning within the environment.”148 In other words, the more 
focused leaders at the top are on their own survival, the more they diminish their ability 
to effect positive change, and the greater the likelihood of experiencing a catastrophic 
result.  
People may be tempted to think that a step toward distributed leadership is a step 
toward cowardice, or that loosening their grip on control is a display of weakness. The 
endemic need to exercise heroic leadership runs deep, but an emphasis on inclusion, 
interconnectedness, and trust weaves a web that actually doubles as a safety net. In 
Leadership and Organizing: Sensemaking in Action, Annie Pye writes, “This draws 
attention to what occurs between people rather than on heroes or stars. ‘Not every chief 
executive feels the urge to sing, conduct the band and play the drums. Many of our 
respondents were reported to adopt a somewhat more androgynous approach involving 
immediate colleagues in discussions and decisions not only because it appeared to them 
impossible to do otherwise, but also because they appeared to be convinced that sharing 
secures better decisions and even greater effort from those with whom one shares 
influence.”149  
No single, prescriptive method of incorporating distributed leadership exists. It 
acknowledges different forms of leading and incorporates diverse relationships. It uses 
various methods of collaboration in an effort to identify innovative solutions to crises. 
Spillane describes a number of these cooperative variables using sports analogies.  
Analyzing interactions among leaders in the co-performance of leadership 
practice, my colleagues and I have identified three types of distribution: 
Collaborated distribution characterizes leadership practice that is stretched 
over the work of two or more leaders who work together in place and time 
to execute the same leadership routine, such as facilitating a faculty 
meeting. The co-practice in this situation is similar to that in basketball, in 
which players must interact with one another, passing to teammates when 
they stop dribbling and working to set one another up to shoot. Collective 
148 Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch, “Toward a Contextual Theory of Leadership,” 827. 
149 Pye, “Leadership and Organizing: Sensemaking in Action,” Leadership, 36. 
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distribution characterizes practice that is stretched over the work of two or 
more leaders who enact a leadership routine by working separately but 
interdependently. The interdependencies are akin to those in baseball or 
cricket, in which players at bat perform alone, but their actions in 
interaction with that of the pitcher or bowler collectively produce the 
practice. Coordinated distribution refers to leadership routines that involve 
activities that have to be performed in a particular sequence. The 
interdependency in this situation is similar to that in a relay race in track; 
the co-performance of the relay race depends on a particular ordered 
sequence. These three types of distribution are not mutually exclusive; a 
single leadership routine could involve more than one type.150 
The fusion of these three types of distributive leadership can be seen in the 
preparation and response to the Boston Marathon Bombings. On April 15, 2013, two 
bombs made out of pressure cookers exploded near the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon killing three and injuring nearly 270. Approximately 26,000 participants had 
either completed the race or were still running in addition to all of the bystanders. Due to 
the scale of the incident, a massive coordinated response by local, state and federal 
emergency personnel resulted.151  
A “Lessons Learned” publication by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
reveals the three models of leadership in action. The greater Boston area and 
Massachusetts exercised together multiple times prior to the event. They demonstrated 
collaborated distribution by co-practicing the response to a “complex terrorist attack” 
that included participants from “law enforcement, fire, EMS, communication centers, 
private sector communities, and non-governmental organizations.”152 Advanced 
interoperability efforts made collective distribution possible. WebEOC was cited as “the 
most effective tool during the Boston Marathon bombings to acquire and communicate 
important data concerning critical needs and resources.”153 The cyber tool, in addition to 
previously established relationships among all of the involved leaders, facilitated the 
successful interdependent response. Lastly, coordinated distribution occurred when the 
150 Spillane, Distributed Leadership. 
151 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Boston Marathon Bombings: The Positive Effect of 




                                                 
National Weather Service changed its mission from weather forecasting to the evaluation 
of air quality. Leaders operated in an ordered sequence as they waited for National 
Weather Service staff to “determine whether the explosions contained toxins or 
hazardous chemicals.”154  
Leaders in the numerous disciplines involved in the preparation and response to 
the event probably did not discuss the fact that they had been, and were participating in, 
various forms of collaborated, collective, or coordinated distribution of leadership. 
However, the ground that was laid through partnerships and leader interaction facilitated 
their ability to respond appropriately to a complex crisis. What started as the 117th 
edition of a marathon, transitioned to substantial disequilibrium, and then returned to a 
complicated, but manageable event.  
The Joplin tornado, the Yarnell Hill fire, and the Boston Marathon bombings, 
serve as examples of how, in a complex crisis, no single, prescriptive form of distributed 
leadership will suit every need. Complex crises call for adaptive leadership capable of 
employing various distributed leadership methods. They call for complexity in leading.  
Complexity in leading can be aided with tools. Parallel processing is one of them.  
C. PARALLEL PROCESSING 
1. Uncertainty 
Parallel processing is, as its name implies, the act of simultaneously examining 
multiple methods of solving a problem. Where distributed leadership is about involving 
the right people, parallel processing is about providing the right opportunities.  
Consistent with adaptive leadership principles, parallel processing is based on the 
assumption that better (more innovative/creative) solutions to crises may be available if 
leadership facilitates the occasion for their identification. The first step in that facilitation 
process is leadership’s acknowledgement of the unknown. 
154 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Boston Marathon Bombings: The Positive Effect of 
Planning and Preparation on Response. 
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In The Strategy Paradox, Raynor writes, “What is new is that here uncertainty is 
not an afterthought, not something one considers after commitments have been made. 
Instead, uncertainty is placed at the core of decision making at the highest levels of the 
organization, for only in this way can we hope to address the paradox created by 
uncertainty.”155 This undertaking is no small task, as acknowledging uncertainty during 
crises requires leaders to concede they do not have all the answers, and at the same time, 
take action in an unpredictable direction. Raynor continues, “The strategy paradox arises 
from the need to commit in the face of unavoidable uncertainty.”156  
If innovative behavior is going to emerge out of crises, it will require the support 
of top management.157 That support can be demonstrated by providing space for 
alternative solutions, by parallel processing. Adaptive leaders can move beyond the 
acknowledgement of uncertainty, and actually accommodate it by giving stakeholders a 
place to “behave symmetrically in some situations and asymmetrically in others.”158 
2. Options 
Creating space for innovation means institutionalizing a culture of options 
thinking. “Doing so, indeed, can ‘turn the tables’ on unconventional crises. While they 
thrive on an organization’s blind zones, the organization can return the favor by also 
exploiting the blind zones of crisis, which always exist if one would only look for 
them.”159 Raynor asserts that organizations should maintain a “portfolio” of strategic 
options.160 An example of inculcating an options-thinking culture in private business is 
the Microsoft Corporation.  
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It is clear that people and organizations can adapt effectively. Consider, 
for example, Microsoft’s oft-cited and well-regarded response to the rise 
of the Internet. In the mid-1990s, Microsoft’s product suite was based on 
stand-alone personal computers with perhaps peripheral connections to 
company networks. As a result, Microsoft’s strategy was built on the 
notion of islands of productivity. The rise of the Internet as a transforming 
technology in personal computing resulted in a remarkable transformation 
that served to “Internet-enable” many of Microsoft’s key products: the 
islands in the archipelago had become bone fide nodes in a global 
network. Encapsulated in the now-famous mantra “embrace and extend,” 
Microsoft did not fight the Internet or even resist it. In classic judo 
fashion, the company redirected the power of this new technology to its 
benefit.161 
3. Parallel Processing in Action 
The key to employing the alternative strategy of parallel processing is to mobilize 
it early in the crisis. As standard response measures are put into action, a team of 
disparate creative thinkers should be assembled with the instruction to think differently 
about solutions to the crisis. In “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Snowden 
and Boone write, “The minute you encounter a crisis, appoint a reliable manager or crisis 
management team to resolve the issue. At the same time, pick out a separate team and 
focus its members on the opportunities for doing things differently. If you wait until the 
crisis is over, the chance will be gone.”162 
An example of parallel processing in action is the Chilean mine accident of 
August 2010. Thirty-three miners were trapped for 69 days in a collapsed copper and 
gold mine 2,300 feet underground. Many technical, complicating factors made the rescue 
effort nearly impossible. What resulted, however, was a commitment to parallel 
processing. Witnesses to the crisis write, “Later, the rescue operation would similarly 
pursue multiple solutions at once, employing three different drilling systems—Plans A, 
B, and C—in parallel.”163  
161 Raynor, The Strategy Paradox: Why Committing to Success Leads to Failure (and What to Do 
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This situation reflects parallel processing in action, three individual plans 
simultaneously formulated by three separate teams of experts utilizing different 
technologies. Moreover, as the drilling plans progressed, they began to look at the phases 
of the rescue that would be best suited by the contrasting plans. “It also allowed the 
rescue operation to divide its forces, freeing some to focus on the more difficult second 
phase even while the first was under way. This parallel processing, which became a 
hallmark of the operation, is actually a requirement for success in chaotic 
environments.”164 
Reflecting on the Chilean Mine event, the Harvard Business Review produced a 
graphic (see Figure 2) that illustrates the processes that should occur in parallel during 
complex crises. As displayed, they have divided the two processes between the headings 
“direct” and “enable.”  
 
 
Figure 2.  Processes that should occur in parallel during complex crises165 
164 Rashid, Edmondson, and Leonard, Leadership Lessons from the Chilean Mine Rescue, 116. 
165 Ibid., 117. 
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4. Reflecting in Action 
Important to the success of parallel processing is the ability of crisis leaders to 
consider where they have been as frequently as where they are going. Asking, “What if 
we had done it differently?” may pioneer a new direction forward. “In emerging crises, 
agent-managers need to be able to quickly develop and utilize emergent strategies that 
allow them to…’ reflect in action.’”166 The principle of reflecting in action was utilized 
in the Chilean mine rescue. Those leaders continued to push the work on while searching 
for new solutions. They “acted quickly and yet took time to reflect.”167 
In France, an organization has formalized this process through the creation of a 
“Rapid Reflection Force.” The Crisis Response Journal suggested this form of parallel 
processing in 2006, and Électricité de France, a nuclear power plant, put it to use.168 
Using a diverse group of experts, it created an on-call team responsible for thinking 
holistically and creatively about solutions to active crises. While initially it was 
successfully used in simulations, it gained legitimacy when employed for a number of 
crises that ranged from a rash of employee suicides to hurricane-damaged 
infrastructure.169  
The Rapid Reflection Force creates opportunities for organizations to address 
crises for which no toolkit is at the ready, it is a “discovery process.”170 Authors of a 
Crisis Response Journal article note that, for the Électricité de France, the Rapid 
Reflection Force, “lays the groundwork for a new culture, new operational ‘grammars,’ 
and—last but not least—new networking capabilities when the name of the game is 
partnership, collective innovation and resilience.”171 
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5. What Is Known 
Therefore, the use of alternative strategies is an exercise of complexity itself. The 
Strategy Paradox illustrates the need to exercise risk if it is hoped to see greater success 
in leading through complex crises. In the search for alternative solutions, adaptive leaders 
need to find ways to prepare for, or even embrace, uncertainty. Doing that requires 
looking at leadership in new and unfamiliar ways. It requires leaders to become less 
territorial and to make use of “cross-scale thinking” that links leaders in a networking 
fashion. Adaptive leaders recognize that order may emerge not only from the top-down, 
but also from bottom-up or middle-out.  
Adaptive leadership looks for opportunities to exercise new ideas and adopts 
“options-thinking.” Making a habit of this type of thinking about leadership is 
transformative. It is adaptive. It is complex. 
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VI. FINDINGS 
Innovation is taking two things that already exist and putting them 
together in a new way. 
—Tom Freston 
The research found that indeed, all homeland security crises are not created equal. 
There is a kind of crisis that is exponentially more difficult to prepare for and lead 
through, and is distinct by more than just the scale of the event. They have characteristics 
similar to those found in complex systems, such as large-scale networking, leaderless 
networks, and adaptation. These crises are hard to predict and they can sometimes be 
perpetrated by a relatively small number of criminals relative to the amount of 
destruction they impose.  
The study found that the modern world presents opportunities for increased 
complexity in crises not possible as recently as 20 years ago. Events, such as 9/11, and 
the Mumbai terrorist attack, are just two examples of how publicly available, present-day 
technologies, such as satellite phones, Google Earth, GPS devices, social media, and the 
Internet, were combined in a creative way to exact reprehensible consequences.  
As to the “nature” of contemporary crises, the research did not definitively find 
that it had changed. Nothing indicated that bad people are worse today than in the past or 
that their evil intent has changed over time. Likewise, it would appear that the good 
people of today do as much as any ever have in their attempts to combat evil. To the 
extent that the “nature” of a crisis refers to its essence, the research was unable to draw a 
concrete conclusion. Even a highly complex, or even “wicked” crisis, may not be 
different in nature so much as it adds complications that increase unpredictability and 
result in greater consequence. In short, the research is unable to determine if today’s 
crises have a different DNA than those of previous generations.  
Having found that some contemporary crises are exponentially more complex, the 
research investigated opportunities for adaptation on the part of homeland security 
leaders. It revealed that some homeland security leaders are, in fact, playing by an 
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obsolete set of rules. They demonstrate forms of maladaptive leadership through the 
exercise of heroic leadership and an overreliance on best practices.  
That said, the study found that, in fact, opportunities for adaptation do exist. 
While they may not be in common use among homeland security leaders, adaptation to 
complex crisis does exist through a number of alternative strategies. Specifically, the 
research identified the place for distributed leadership and parallel processing. A form of 
distributed leadership was successfully used in the Joplin, Missouri tornado, and the 
Yarnell Hill wildfire, in Arizona. Parallel processing was seen as a success for crises 
involving a French nuclear power plant and in the Chilean mine rescue.  
A. LIMITATIONS 
The most significant limitation of the study is the scope of the research. It was not 
possible to examine every, or perhaps even most, of the methods of leadership that exist 
in homeland security. Identifying a single definition for leadership is a thesis of its own, 
let alone a comprehensive investigation into every style of homeland security leadership 
as practiced today. The examination relied heavily on scholarly research; however, 
because of the limited scope, the study was guided by a mixture of the writer’s 
experience in leading, in having been led, and in observing numerous leadership styles. 
Obviously, the author is finite, and as such, has limitations to his experience. The 
limitation in scope does not diminish the validity of the findings, but it does point to the 
fact that dozens of undiscovered strategies for adaptation for homeland security leaders 
are likely to exist. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the results of the study, several recommendations for future research are 
made. 
• A place to investigate in greater detail the styles of leadership in homeland 
security that currently exist, in an effort to discover those that are adapting 




• A need exists to identify, codify, and promulgate more alternative 
strategies (i.e., find more tools for the toolbox). Dedicating time to the 
research of innovative solutions used in disciplines other than homeland 
security would be a worthwhile pursuit.  
• A gap exists between the identification of alternative strategies and their 
implementation. The author recommends research into the creation of 
effective implementation strategies that consider the solutions themselves 
and the way in which they could be tailored to individual homeland 
security disciplines.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Three major conclusions can be made from this study. The first conclusion is the 
recognition that opportunities exist for complexity in crises unique to contemporary 
society. As noted in the limitations, this study does not attempt to quantify the number of 
homeland security leaders who fail to recognize that crises can be different based solely 
on the fact that they occur today and not 25 years ago. While no percentage points to the 
pervasiveness of the problem, the research, along with common sense and frequent 
observation, demonstrate that the ways in which homeland security leaders currently lead 
do not demonstrate a healthy understanding of the potential for increased complexity.  
There are implications to homeland security leaders that fail to recognize the 
potential for complexity in modern crises. If it is assumed that the homeland security 
leaders of today have 20 or more years on the job, then the “highly successful” leadership 
methods observed throughout their career are now outmoded. They suffer from a longer-
term form of an overreliance on best practices. They are exercising today what worked in 
the past with an insufficient regard for what the future may hold. In this scenario, as with 
a crisis from any age, the adage “a failure to plan is a plan to fail” is apropos. A failure to 
plan for uncertainty is quite possibly a fatal flaw to the superlative degree.  
The second conclusion is that opportunities for complexity are not limited to 
crises. Occasions for complexity in leading do exist. Having recognized the potential for 
crisis complexity, homeland security leaders need to pursue resourceful solutions. The 
research uncovered alternative strategies that could be leveraged against crises. The 
strategies are incapable of preventing complex crises, but they may hold the key to 
mitigating their consequences and increasing the nation’s resilience. An 
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acknowledgement of crisis complexity potential should motivate homeland security 
leaders to prepare for uncertainty in innovative ways. It should drive them to recruit new 
ideas and implement new processes that recognize the potential for complexity in crises.  
It is not possible to know with certainty what effects a renewed attitude about 
crises would have. The alternative strategies suggested in the research in distributed 
leadership and parallel processing point to the fact that some successes may be 
referenced. The degree to which more successes may be experienced appears to be 
limited only by the innovative resolve of homeland security leaders.  
The research did not set out to investigate the third conclusion, but it arose out of 
the process of the inquisition that an essential place for reflection in the process of 
preparing for and leading through complex crises exists. The study jumped into the pool 
of complexity with both feet. It also assumed, and found, that a body of literature 
addressed the concepts of maladaptive leadership. However, the importance of reflection 
percolated to the top with some consistency. The idea of evaluating progress is only one 
facet of the concept. Reflection seemed to present the idea that homeland security leaders 
need to take time to be more introspective about their place in leading in the 
contemporary world. Opportunities for complexity have changed the game, quite literally 
in front of their eyes. The need for creativity and the courage to seek for innovation is an 
integral part of addressing those concerns. However, for homeland security leaders to 
acknowledge that some of their professional upbringing may be irrelevant, and that others 
may have better ideas about leading in certain circumstances, is humbling.  
An element of reflection is necessary before taking on the challenge of 
acknowledging and preparing for complex crises, as well as the need for ongoing 
reflection as innovative solutions are sought and implemented. It is quite possible that the 
most complex piece of the equation is not the crisis, but homeland security leaders 
themselves. Every reason exists to believe that the opportunities for complexity in crises 
will only increase over time. However, with the appropriate attitude about crises and 
about themselves, homeland security leaders have the potential to get ahead of the next 
complex crisis by preparing to lead adaptively. They have the potential to fight 
complexity with complexity. 
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Meanwhile, Back at Highlake … 
Chief Jacobson grabs a piece of paper and hastily begins to scratch down general 
problem areas: 
• Hazardous materials response (how bad is this stuff?) 
• YouTube/social media (who controls this? can we turn it off?) 
• Hate groups (are the Sovereign Knights legit? do we have any names?) 
• School response (are children already exposed?) 
• Restaurant response (is food already contaminated?) 
• Thousands of visitors (do I try to stop them?) 
For a moment, the chief’s head begins to spin and he feels his heart palpitate. He 
watches as people hurriedly file into the emergency operations center and look 
expectantly at him for answers, for guidance, for leadership.  
Within seconds, they break their gaze, remembering that they have planned for 
such a time as this, and spring into action. Not that anyone had experienced this situation 
before—binders with corresponding checklists or notes from tabletop exercises that 
involved this particular culmination of threats did not exist. However, what they have 
done is prepare for uncertainty.  
Chief Jacobson faces a whiteboard and prominently begins to write objectives: 
• Ensure the safety of citizens and first responders 
• Control source of hazmat 
• Manage the coordinated response, etc. 
Initial ICS assignments complete, Chief Jacobson recognizes that this crisis 
demands logistical, physical, and expert resources he did not have within his police 
department. Determined not to play the victim, he recognizes his need for innovation, 
flexibility, and out-of-the-box thinking.  
As he considers the disparate pieces of the complex puzzle, the chief begins to 
remember the faces and names of people with whom he had discussed the idea of 
adaptive response to complex crises. He recalls relationships he had forged at all levels 
within the police department, members of the business community, media personnel, 
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school officials, local politicians, and many others. He requests their response, and by 
name, forms customized expert panels.  
Chief Jacobson identifies two individual workspaces separate from the emergency 
operations center and assigns an assistant chief to each space. Consistent with previous 
discussions about adaptive leadership, the assistant chiefs are not surprised when they are 
tasked with leading diverse groups of experts with the goal of creative problem solving. 
Within minutes, the room is abuzz with inventive exchanges.  
As incident commander, Chief Jacobson balances his role of piloting the standard 
response to the crisis while remaining in contact with his assistant chiefs. He probes the 
crisis in search of opportunities to employ their innovative solutions where appropriate, 
he evaluates the impact of each decision, and provides feedback to everyone involved. 
• What results is an unusual amalgamation of processes, ideas, and 
ultimately, solutions. 
• What results are a complex answers to a complex crisis. 
• What results is adaptive leadership—fighting complexity with complexity. 
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